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AUTHOR: 


HOPPIN, JAMES MASON 


TITLE: 


NOTES ON ARISTOTLE'S 


PLACE: 


NEW YORK 


DATE: 


1882 


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[108 | 
28 3 | 
ig Hoppin, James liason, 1820-1906, | 
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Wotes on Aristotle's Ethics, Bks, eae ‘oe IV, 
Υ ᾿ Ϊ ; 
X, by J. M. Hoppin... liew York, Sherwood, 1882. | 
65 pe Οὐ, om in £5 cn, 


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; THOMAS W. ‘Ow 
NOTES THOMAS w. LUDLOW, 
No, 244 East +3thbst., 


NEW YORK, 25 jWN1882. 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS: 


Bes. dil AVE Xo 


J. M. HOPPIN, JR,, 


B. A., Christ. Church, Oxford: 


NEW YORK: 
A. Ὁ. SHERWOOD ἃ Co.,- PRINTERS, 76 E> NINTH: STREET. 
᾿ 1882. 


MLUEVIUNE, 


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ARISTOTLE’S BTHICS: 


DKS. 1, 0, Ty ive 


ὃ. M. HOPPIN, JR, 


B. A., Christ Church, Oxford. 


NEW YORK: 
A. G. SHERWOOD & Co., PRINTERS, 76 E. NINTH STREET. 
1882. 


τς tte ig geese ᾿. Sa" lea δ ὡς eae sss: ὦ 


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ARISTOT L: OM igs 2B - ὅν" 


Bes, Ἢ, ἘΣ 251, Εν, 


SHow How ARISTOTLE ARRIVES AT HIS DEFINITION. OF 
MORAL VIRTUE. 


er ‘ ᾽ , ΟῚ - \ “ὦ 
éFis προαιρετικὴ ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ TPOS ἡμᾶσ, 
, ” ς , 
ὡρισμένῃ λέγῳ, καὶ ws ἂν ὁ Ppovipos ὁρίσειεν. 
Bk. II. 6. 


ἔξι5 is explained in Ch. 5. Since all the attributes of the 
Soul are πάθη, δυνάμει, ἕξει, and as virtue cannot (for rea- 
sons assigned) be either maQos or δύναμι5, we obtain ἔξ 15 as 
its proper genus. 
Nor πάθη. 
(1.) We do not apply the terms right and wrong, praise and 
blame, to πάθη, as we obviously do to virtue. 
There is no 2poaipeois in πάθη, but there is in virtue. 
We are said to be moved [κινεῖσθαι] by πάθη, but to be 
in “some way disposed” [διακεῖσθαί πω] by virtue, 
and this difference in language implies a difference in fact. 


-) 
) 


(2 
(3 


Not δύναμι. 


(1.) As in the case of πάθη, we do not apply the terms right 
and wrong, praise and blame, to ὃ UVa EIS. 
(2.) δυνάμει5 come by nature, and virtue does not. 
Ergo, if virtue is neither a πάθος nor a Svuvapts, it must be a 


ἕξι. 
οὖς ΨΊΚΤΟΕ is a ξξ τ = genus. 


προαιρετικῆ is added on the strength of what was said in 

Ch. 4. 1. εἰδωδ. pers oe Requisites 
2. mMpoaipovpEevos δι AUTC. : of a 

3. βεβαίως καὶ apetTanivyt@s ἔἐχῶν. ) moral action 


Ἔν μεσότητι οὖσα, τῇ πρὸ5 Nuds—in thé relative mean. 
He shows that every art, or practical science seeks the relative 
mean, and avoids the extremes of excess and defect—a fortiori, 
this will be the case with the pre-eminent science of Moral 
Virtue. - 

ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ is added, because the mean is relative and 
not mathematically exact; so that it must be determined from 
time to time by reason. 

@s ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν is added, because it might be 
asked, Where is the reason to be found? Aristotle regards 


reason as embodied in the “man of practical common sense.” 


ANALYSIS. 
In Bk. I. ch. 8, Aristotle proves his definition of happiness by 
comparing it with the definitions of preceding philosophers. 


I. 
Pythagoreans divided goods into three heads: 
(1.) τὰ ψυχῆϑ 
(2.) τὰ σώματος 
(3.) Ta ἐκτὸς 
but they made goods of the sow/ the most important. Aristotle's 
definition implies this, because— 
(a.) He makes Happiness an activity of the σον. 
(4.) Because “activity,” or “moral action,” is not external, but 


an interna! good. 
LT. 


The Happy Man is said εὖ Civ καὶ εὖ πράττειν, the defi- 

nition of Aristotle is almost the same. 
ΤΥ. 

The Cynics said that happiness was ἀρετή. Aristotle in his 
definition makes happiness an &vépyéta “aT ᾿ἀρετὴν, and it is 
important that we should consider it an ἐνέργεια, because it is 
only those who act rightly that can obtain the good and honor- 
able things in life. [ἐπήβολοι τῶν ἐν τῷ βιῷ καλῶν. 
I. vill. ro. 

TV. 

Socrates said it was PPOVvnels, practical wisdom ; the discus- 

sion of this, Aristotle leaves to the VIth Bk. 


“ 


J 


V. 
Anaxagoras said it was Copia, speculative wisdom ; this again 
left to Bk. VI. (Baser element of world=vows.) 


VI. 

The Cyrenaics said it was with pleasure. Aristotle agrees with 
this, because he thinks that his happiness will naturally involve 
pleasure of a higher kind: 

(r.) It is present in a higher manner it is inherent in the acts 

themselves. [ὁ ios καθ᾽ αὑτὸν ἡδύς. 
.) It is of a higher sort, natural [pvoer], not artificial. 
3.) It is more comprehensive, including TO καλὸν + τὸ aya- 
Gov, as well as τὸ 7068. 


VIL. 

Xenocrates included external prosperity. Aristotle agrees with 
this, for he thinks it necessary that a man should have certain 
external advantages, i. e., he must not be deformed [παναίσχηϑ], 
low-born [dvoyevns], or childless [ἀτερν 051. 


VILL, 


(2 
( 


Delian epigram: 
 Καάλλιστον τὸ δικαιότατον, λῷστον δ᾽ ὑγιαίνειν, 
ἥδιστον δὲ πέφυχ᾽ οὗ TIS ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν." 


This separates various kinds of excellent and advantageous 
things. Aristotle does not agree with it, because they are a// tn- 
volved in his idea of happiness, and although he thinks that pros- 
perity is riecessary to happiness, he does not agree with the 
Cyrenaics, who identify evtvyia with happiness. 


‘ ¢ ~ 
SoLon’s Dicrum [χρεῶν téAos opav]. 
Bx. I. Cu. το] SoLron Sar, “Catt No Man Happy TILL HE 
is DEAD.” ar 


A. Did he mean that death was positive happiness? We who 
have made happiness an activity of the soul, cannot, of course, 
place it in the extinction of that activity. 

B. But perhaps Solon did not mean that death was osztive 
happiness, but that the dead might be ca//ed happy, as being be- 
yond the reach of evils and misfortunes ; but if there is some good 
and evil to the /iving man, who is not aware of it [μῆ aio @avo- 


4 


μέν ᾧ], ἰβ there not some also to the dead? e. g. honor and dis- 
honor, and the good and evil of descendants, 

Here there arises a question, whether he will not be affected 
by the good and evil of descendants (discussed in next ch.), 

C. In looking to the end, then, are we to say that a man Aas 
been happy, and not to say that he is happy now, while he is enjoy- 
ing happiness? and that, because we have conceived happiness 
to be something “oviuor and unchangeable [μηδαμῶς εὐμετά- 
βολον]. 

This is to make happiness depend on the τύχαι, whereas the 
virtuous energies [ai κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαι] are its basis* 
[κύριαι], and the βεβαιότης wanted is nowhere greater than in 
those energies. 

As regards τύχαι good or bad— 


if smalli—they will not affect the balance of life [ῥοπή] 

if darge—good ones will make life more happy ; bad will 
crush or spoil happiness: still, even these may 
ao of virtuous energies, and so far 


Bx. II. Cu. 4.] “Wr Become Just, By Doinc Just Actions.” 
WHEN THE Dorinc or THEM SHows US TO BE JUST. 
(Apparent paradox.) 

Just as a work of art shows a man to be an artist. 

This last Is not true; a man may do a work of art, ἀπὸ τύχη 
καὶ ἄλλου ὑποθεμένου, and is no artist, unless he possesses skilj 
in himself. 

Again, the arts are not a parallel case ; im the arts we look only 
to the excellence of the production [τὸ ev]; and only knowledge is 


required, but ἐπ ¢he virtues we look to the manner of doing a thing. 
It must be done— 


(1.) ¢i6@s—with knowledge. 

(2.) προαιρούμενος 61 avto—deliberate choice for the thing’s 
own sake. 

(3.) βεβαίως καὶ αἀμεταπκινήτως &ya@v—with fixity and sta- 
bility. ) 


᾿ vg ee Ἂ . Ἀ 
This incidentally confirms Aristotle's definition of happiness, 


These are the three conditions in the mind of the agent, to 


make a virtuous action. 


Bx. II]. Cu. 5.7] κέν. “ VirTUE AND VICE ARE EQUuAL- 
LY VOLUNTARY. 

If the end=is the object of wish [βουλητὸν], and the means= 
the object of deliberation [fovdAevra] and deliberate choice 
[προαιρετα], then the acts respecting these must be voluntary. 
Now, with these acts, virtuous energies are concerned ; therefore 
virtue is voluntary ; so, too, is vce, for if we can do, we can for- 
bear, and vice versa (parity of reasoning). 

Freewill is further proved : 

I. Man is the @ pyn of his actions, and if so, they are 
voluntary. 

II. In governments the voluntariness of wicked actions alone 
causes them to be punished by lawgivers, who also 
reward virtuous actions (practical proof )." 

III. As for want of knowledge [ἄγνοια] being an excuse, 
men are punished for that also, when self-caused 
and voluntary. 

If drunkenness is the excuse, men ought not to have got 
drunk: if they were ignorant of the laws, they ought 
to have informed themselves of them.—[“Tois μεθύ- 
ovo. διπλᾶ Ta ἐπιτίμια," law of Pittacus, of My- 
tilene. | 

But perhaps some men are not capable of applying them- 
selves to their duty. Who made them so? They 
themselves did, by the repetition of such actions, as 
went to form their characters. | 

. To plead that that they did not know that such actions 
would form a habit, is a mark of extreme stupidity. 

It is absurd for men to plead that they did not wzsh 
to become morally evil; men do not wish to become 
unhealthy. i ior 

. Bodily faults which are in our own power are blamed, 
and no others; therefore, vice being blamed, may be 
considered as in our power. (Axa/logy.) 


6 


IX. It may be said that a man aims at the Parvo pevov 
ἄγαθον, and that this (or his φαντασία) is beyond 
his control, being constitutional. But if a man is 
ait10s mos of his constitutional habits, he is like- 
wise of his φαντασία, which is assimilated to 
them. If not, the aiming at the end will be no matter 
of our choice, but fixed by nature, and then virtues 
will be involuntary, as well as vice: so that this proves 
too much. 

X. Suppose the end to be fixed by Nature, still the means 
are in our own power, and if virtue is thus voluntary 
(as men allow), then vce must be voluntary too. Still, 
habits. when formed, are not so much in our own 
power as the single acts which formed them. 

N. B. We are said to be συναίτιοίΐ m@s—in some sense 
joint causes” of our habits—with circumstances: 1. 6. 
habits being formed by acting in a certain way, under 
certain circumstances. We can only choose how we 
will act, not under what circumstances we will act. 
Aristotle thus admits that our habits are, fo some ex- 
tent, the result of causes over which we have no control. 


Bx. II. Cu. 2] Wart 1s THE CHARACTER OF ViRTUOUS ACTS? 

The standard is 0p@0s Aoyos (but this point is reserved for 
Bk. VI.). 

I. They are, then, acts which avoid excess and defect, both of 
which prevent the formation of good habits: they are therefore 
ἐν μεσότητι. 

II. They are acts which produce virtue, and are in their turn 
produced by virtue ; for by abstaining from pleasure we become 
temperate, and the more we abstain, the more we are able to do 
80. 

These two points are suggested by the analogy extsting hetween 
the body and the soul. 

The φανερὰ are bodily habits, the ἀφανῆ the habit of the 
soul. The point of similarity is, that these are parts of the 
same complex being, and the argument from analogy is, that 
they resemble one another— 


/ 


. ‘ ‘ , ; 4 Φιαω ὦ 
Ι. In their formation and growth [γενέσεις καὶ αυδξησεῖβ |. 
II. In their operation [ἐνέργεια] when formed. 


ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY IN ΒΚ. II. Cu. 6. 


Science and art seek the relative mean, and avoid the extremes: 
a fortiori, this will be the case with moral virtue, which is Téyvys 
anpiBEctépa. 

The argument here depends upon the analogy between virtue 
and the arts, 1. e., between the work of man as a moral agent, and 
the work of man as an artistic agent ; and the inference is, that 
what constitutes excellence in the one sort of work (artistic), will 
also constitute excellence in the other sort of work (moral). 

Both will seek the relative mean, and avoid excess and defect. 


Bx. 11. Cu. 7.] For CATatLoGur oF VIRTUES, TO SHOW THAT 
VIRTUE IS A MEAN, SEE ΜΟΟΒΕ, PP. 112—113. 
Aristotle gives the following as supplementary : 
Excess. Mean. Defect. 


HATANANHE ts aid os 


αναισχυντία. 
spy 4 4 
pUovos πος: ΘΝ ἐπιχαιρεπαπία. 


λυῖ Vv EMEOIS and αἰδῶ are not mean states [μεσότητες]: 
that is to say, they are not stationary, as means are, but pass 
away, being πάθη merely ; and because not μεσότητες, they are 
not virtues. 

Νέμεσιϑ is said to be a mean between φθόνος and éx1yaipe- 
κακία. These, however, are not opposed to each other, and 
may exist in the same man. 


Hr Wuo Feets PLEASURE AT VICE AND PAIN AT VIRTUE, IS 
A Novice at Boru.—(Cf. Moore, p. 78.) 

(Cf. Butler's Analogy, Ch. V., six pages from beginning: “ For from our very 

faculties of habits, passive impressions, by being repeated, grow weaker” to 


‘** view of it.’’) 

When a man first begins, he may act with a greater zeal and 
zest, but when the habit is formed, he will have a more quiet 
satisfaction. A young soldier may enter on his first battle with 


e 


φ͵ 


re) 


greater impetuosity, but the veteran is more calm, and each may 
have his respective pleasure. 

So, contra, as regards pain, we may feel it more acutely when 
we first begin to do what is against the grain, but in time we be- 
.come inured to it, and feel a less acute pain, and get more insen- 
sible to the disagreeable. 


EXxPLAIN— 

Πεπαιδευμένου yap ἐστιν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ταἀκριβές ἐπι- 
δητεῖν 

καθ᾿ ἕκαστον γένος, ἐφ᾿ σον ἡ τοῦ πράγματος φύσι 
ἐπιδέχεται. 

Aristotle several times tells us in Bk. I. that accuracy is not to 
be sought in questions of moral philosophy. We find this in his 
account of the mean, anger, etc., and in the division of the soul. 

He says that matters of moral action and expediency have no 
fixedness [βεβαιότη5]}, and that they come under no set of rules 
mapayyéXia|, but that we must act according to circumstances, 

It is in the application of rules to particular details of practice, 
that our responsibility rests. | 

No rules can be so framed that evasion shall be impossible. 


Since praise and dlame (the awards of virtue and vice) are be- 
stowed on voluntary actions, while involuntary ones meet with 
συγγνώμη and ἐἔλεοθ, we ought to show what actions are 
voluntary and what involuntary. The knowledge of this is im- 
portant to legislators, who have to reward and punish. 


Involuntary actions. 


, τ δ ? ἃ 
βίαιον, οὐ ἡ ἀρχῇ 
»Ἤ , 3 
ἔξωθεν, τοιαύτη οὔσα, 


ἐν ἡ μηδὲν συμβάλλεται 
ὁ πράττων ἢ ὁ πάσχων 


ἀκούσια 

done in ignorance of some 
circumstance of the fact (ig- 
norantia facti) : not blame- 
able if attended with re- 
pentance, e. g., an under- 
graduate shot his compan- 
ion, and was greatly dis- 
tressed at the inquest: this 
is ἁκῶν. 


οὐκ Rees i 
(ignorantia facti) 
being not followed by re- 
pentance are blameable, e. g. 
a man does another an inju- 
ry accidentally, and says, “I 
did not mean to do it; but 
never mind, it is just as 
well as it is:” this is ovx— 

ἑκών. 


Voluntary actions. 


τ ς ᾽ ‘ ᾿ ? ~ 
Ov ἢ ἀρχή ἕν AUTO, 
εἰδοτι τὰ καθ ἕκαστα, 
’ ¢ ~ 
εν ois ἢ πρᾶξι. 


ποτ 

Ignorance of the principle 
(ignorantia juris), blame- 
able: 6. g., a criminal was 
hanged for shooting a cler- 
gyman, and wounding the 
clergyman’s wife—rejoiced 
in the murder, justified it, 
and hoped that the wife 
would die :—e. g., man- 
slaughter. 


PERHAPS SOME ONE WILL Say, FROM OUR EXPLANATION OF 
ς ‘ ? / ‘ 
βίαιον, THAT ἡδέα AND καλὰ ARE SO, ἀγαγπκαξειν yap, 


3 » 
ἔξω ὄντα. 


I, But in this way we shall do nothing but what is βέατον, 
for the καλὸν and the ἡδὺ enter into all our actions 
as their principle. 


IO 


Il. Moreover, βέαια cause us to act Avanpas, but the καλὰ 
and ἡδέα; μεθ᾽ ἡδονῆο. 

ΠῚ. It is absurd [ἄτοπον] for a man to blame external cir- 
cumstances, and not himself, who is so easily caught 
[evOnparos| by them, or again, to ascribe the καλῶ to 

_himself, but the αἰσχρὰ to pleasure. 


ΕἾΝΕ REASONS WHY THINGS DONE FROM SPIRIT [θυ μ05] AND 
FROM APPETITE [ἔπεθυμέα] ARE NoT INVOLUNTARY. 

I. If these actions are involunta ry, NO animals, besides men, 
not even children, will be voluntary agents, because 
these are the motives from which they act. 

Il. Perhaps the xaAq@ are ἑκούσια, and the aioypa are 


? , 
axovola. Itis absurd, however, to suppose that one 


cause [be it Θυμόβ or ἐπιθυμία) should produce oppo- 
stte effects. 

We cannot drop the ἑκούσια, because ἐπέ τισι δεῖ 
οργίξεσθαι, καὶ τινῶν δεῖ ἐπιθυμεῖν. δεῖ is 
here the emphatic word. The sense of duty excludes 
the notion of involuntariness. If we ought to do 
anything, it is clearly a voluntary act to do it. 

We must drop the ἀκούσια, for such are λυπηρὰ, but 
the actions we speak of are not so. 

We feel that Ta κατὰ Aoyi6 por ἁμαρτηθέντα and τὰ 
κατα θυμὸν are equaily φευκτά. If one class were 
voluntary and the other involuntary, we should not 
have the same feeling about both, and as man’s pas- 
sions and reason are equally his, it is absurd to attempt 


this distinction between the acts which result from 
them. 


It 


MIXED ACTIONS. 


Partaking of the nature of both, being most like voluntary ac- 
tions, inasmuch as the principle of action is internal [7 ἀρχὴ 
ἐν αὐτῷ], but abstractedly involuntary, inasmuch as all would 
absolutely avoid them [καθ᾽ αὑτὰ μὲν ἀκούσια]. 


Praised, 
When for some 
great good, or to 
avoid some great 
evil, we do that 
which otherwise 
we would not. 

e. g. Zopyrus, 
Scevola, 
Regulus. 


Blamed. 
When for some 
little good, or to 
avoid some /ittle 
evil, we do that 
which we would 
not, 

e. g. Esau, 


Pineda 
When under the 
influence of some 
great bodily tor- 
ment, we do that 
which we ought 
not. 

e. g. Vaaman. 


2 Macc. vi. At 
the feast of Bac- 


Not Paes 
When for any rea- 
son, we do an over- 
whelmingly ἀΐ:- 
gracefulact,as Alc- 
maon, who slew 
his mother, £7- 
phyle, because his 
father commanded 
him. 


chus the Jews were 
compelled to go in 
the procession car- 


rying ivy. 


How pores ARISTOTLE’S SYSTEM IMPLY A FIXED STANDARD 
OF MORALITY, AND HOW WOULD THE ABSENCE OF SUCH 
A STANDARD AFFECT HIS DOCTRINE OF THE MEAN? 


It is said that because there is no tapayyédia, set of rules 
(Bk. II. Ch, 2), no objective code in Aristotle’s system (the stand- ἡ 
ard being the subjective one, of the good man), therefore there is 
no fixed standard. 

This at first sight seems plausible—that the standard is vari- 
able—inasmuch as notions of right and wrong frequently shift, 
and, as Paley says, “Every vice has in its turn been deemed a 
virtue; even assassination, to promote, by a tyrant’s death, the 
public good.” But Aristotle’s “good man” [@zovdaios| would 
not allow this. He would hold that right zs always right, and 
wrong always wrong, and that expediency would never convert 
wrong into right. 

For instance, the principle of justice is eternal, though its ex- 
emplification and details may vary: the good man intuitively per- 


ceives this [ uavrev ἔτι] by his own unassisted light; and what 
thus appears to him, appears to every good man, semper, ubique 
etc. This question is discussed in Bk. III. Ch. 4., in the Dilem- 
ma, respecting the ay abo v and the for Anror, w here he shows 
that τὸ ἀγαθὸν βουλητὸν is identical with τὸ φαινόμενον 


to the good man. (Cf. Bk. X. Ch. 6. Sec. 5.) As regards the 


Omovoaios, therefore, whether regarded morally in_ himself 


; 
lowppar], or as regards others [déxazos], or intellectually 
[φρόνιμο5], the standard is always fixed and unchangeable as 
regards essential principles, any determination as to details being 
oss —— is; how far he m iy be angry, etc. Cf. ὃν aig An- 
| rhe latter part of the quotation may be answered by implica- 
tion ; the good, to be geod, will be in the good man’s subjective 
mean : if it were an extreme either way it would not appear good 
to him, for the mean differs from the excess and defect in hin / 
and not in degree. | oie 


LLUSTRATE THE PRACTICAL CHARACTER OF ARISTOTLE’S 
PHILOSOPHY. 


(a.) He says (in Bk. I.) that the object of his treatise is Οἵ 
γνῶσις alia Tpagis. 


(6.) The young should be taught the practice of morals, before 
they attempt the ¢heory. 

. »»,.,.3. Di. ? a ie - ᾿ 

(c.) He rejects Plato’s abstract ideal of good, as its truth or false- 
hood is indifferent to ethics. 

(4.) He defines happiness as "Ev épyéia ψυχῆς κατ᾽ ἀρίστην 
ἀρετήν. He confines himself to the discussion of man's 
happiness and man’s virtue. 

(e.) In Bk. II. he says that the object of his treatise is not mere 
speculation, but to make men good. 

(f.) He shows that moral virtue is acquired by practice and not 
by. zature. 

(g.) He lays down distinctions between 

> 7 ’ 

ἐνέργεια and δυνα μι 

᾽ , ᾿ ad 

ἐνέργεια “ἕξι 

χρῆσιϑ κ΄ UTHO1S, 


13 


(λ.) He shows in spite of theory, that external prosperity \s nec- 
essary to complete the idea of happiness. 

(1) He rejects the notions of the Sfoics, who define the virtues 
as states of mere qutetude. [ἀπαθείας Tivas καὶ 
ἡρεμία5.1ὺ Virtue consists in the due regulation of all 
the parts of our nature (Book X.). 

(7.) In conclusion, he shows that in matters connected with 
ethics, ¢heory must be carried on to practice. Hence we 
must look to some authority to enforce good habitation. 

(4.) It is énductive, starting from common facts [orz] that are 
within the phucrvusiod of all—ém) ras apyas. 

(2) Theory of habits in ΒΚ. 11. 


(m.) Rules for conduct in Bk. II. 9 


MODIFICATION OF THE MEAN. 

A ristotle’s mean is not an absolute mean, but a relative one—rel- 
ative, i. e. to the circumstances of different individuals. It is im- 
vossible to lay down rules which will meet every case, or to re- 
duce morals to a rigid or mathematical precision. ‘This appears 
from the words ὡρισμένῃ hoy@ i in his definition of virtue. That 
is, the varying standard of the mean must be calculated from time 
to time by reason. He says it is difficult to define how, and with 
whom, and on what occasions, we should be angry.*” Small devia- 
tions from the ideal mean are not important, and we must some- 
times incline to the and sometimes to the defect, for so we 
shall be most likely to hit the mean. Three practical rules are 
given : 

(1.) Avoid the extreme, most opposed to the mean, in the nature of 

things. 

(2.) Avoid the extreme, to which our natural inclination | ἐπίδο- 

G1s | tends. 
(3.) Beware of pleasure. 


CLASSIFICATION OF GOODS. 


First division : 
(1.) Goods pursued for their ows sake. 


* Cf. St. Paul, “ Be angry, and sin not.” 


14 


(2.) Goods pursued for their own sake, and for the sake of some- 
thing else. 
(3.) Goods pursued for the sake of something else. 
Second division : 
(1.) External goods. 
(2.) Goods of soul. 
(3.) Goods of ody. 
Third division : 
(1.) Potential, can be abused according to taste of possessor. 
Cf. riches and bodily strength = potential. 
Actual, cannot (I. 12.). 


- LEGISLATORS. 

Bk. I. 13. Legislators study ἀρετὴ, ©. g. those of the 
Cretans and Lacedemonians ; hence it is in conformity 
with Aristotle’s plan to consider it. 

Bk. III. Legislators, who have to reward and punish, 
should know what actions are voluntary, and what in- 
voluntary. 


Bk. III. The practice of legislators [νομοθέτη5] con- 


firms Aristotle’s view, that vice is voluntary: they reward 
virtue and punish vice. 
He shows that moral training must be enforced by the zw- 
tervention of the state. 
Φιλία. 


Bk. II. Enumerated as one of the πάθη--- liking,” “af- 
fection.” 

Bk. IL.-IV. As a virtue; “friendliness,” or “courtesy ἡ 
[φιλέα ἄνευ τοῦ στέργειν]. 

Bk. VIII. “Friendship.” 

δύναμι. 

Bk. I. 1. τέχνη as opposed to science. 

As aclass of goods with éexaiveta and τέμια----Βκ. I. 12. 
δυνάμει things which are potentially, but not neces- 
sarily good (cf. riches). 

(3.) Bk. IL. Capacities of receiving impressions from the πάθη 
(potentially) in the same chapter with ‘Seis and πάθη. 
N.B. δύναμιβ (capacity) potentially is opposed to ἐνέργεια 


15 


(activity), because δύναμι may be dormant or abused: cf, évép- 
yéta—éG15, χρῆσιο---κτῆσιδ. 


INSTANCES OF EXTREMES MEETING. 
The rash man is also a coward. 


The prodigal is also illiberal. 
The falsely modest man is also boastful. 


NAMELESS STATES. 

There is a mameless mean on the subject of small honor, the 
extremes are said to contend for it. Cf. the illustration 
of the favorite dish. [ἀμφισβητεῖν τὰ anpa.| 

ὀργιλότηο---πρᾳότης---ἀοργησία, are names employed 
for the states περὶ ὀργήν. 


, ‘ , ᾽ , ” / 
Φαντασία---τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθον. opeSis [= βουλη- 
ois], wish, desire, occurs in definition of mpoaipeois = βουλευ- 


, » 


» ~ > ς ~ 
τικῇ OpPESIS τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῶν. 


Aristotle draws his illustrations from three sources :—1. Μεαι- 
cine; 2. Gymnastics; 3. Lawgivers. 


Πολιτικπκή. 

Bk. I. 2. Moral Philosophy. 

Bk. I. 2. μέθοδος πολιτική Tts =treatise on moral phi- 
losophy. 

πολιτική = statesmanship. 

Bk. III. πολιτική τε: first and best of the spurions kinds 
of courage. 

πολιτικὸ5 Pvoet=social being. 

mwoAitinos fios=Zlife of a citizen, with all its privileges 
of which slaves have no share. 

Bk. I. 12. πολιτιρκοϑ = moral philosopher, lawgiver, poli- 
ticlan. 

πολιτικὰ =native militia. 


τό 


ΦΜΟΒΑΙ, VIRTUES ARE ‘STATES’ OF THE EMOTIONS.” 


Explain, and discuss how far Aristotle agrees with this. 


Before answering this question, we acttie the meaning of the 
word “state” in English. If it means “present condition, which 
may be transitory, it is a nivyois, and the above accordingly = 
not true. But if by “state” we mean the “settlea character,” it 
will be true enough in regard to moral virtue, but it does not 
touch intellectual virtue. Aristotle would make éG 15 “settled 
ways of being affected by the πάθη, either εὖ OF κακῶϑβ. 
"Βξεις -- καθ᾽ ἂς mpos πάθη ἔχομεν εὖ ἢ HANDS ; 6. g., if 
our anger is too vehement or too slack, κακῶ5 ἔχομεν ; but if 
τ isin the mean, εὖ ἔχομεν. We are said "ινεῖσθαι, by the 
πάθη, which are transient merely, but διακεῖσθαι by the ἕξ ει5, 
which are lasting. 

Duty. 

Aristotle’s notion of duty is expressed when he says: 4éi δὲ 
καὶ ὀργίξεσθαι ἐπί τισι, καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν τιν ὧν δε. 

So, too, in ΒΚ. II. 9: ᾿Αποκλίνειν δὲ δεῖ, ὁτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν 
ὑπερβολήν, ὁτὲ δὲ “én τὴν ἔλλειψιν. 


EDUCATION. 


(x.) Bk. I. Only an educated man [πεπαιδευμέν ο5] fit stu- 
dent for moral philosophy. 

(2.) Bk. 11. 1. Makes no little difference whether we are 
trained in such or such a way from our youth. [ηχθαι.] 

(3.) Plato said that true education consisted in learning to Zhe 
and dislike the right thing. 

(4.) Bk. X. 9. Moral training as necessary for the attainment 
of virtue. 


A Man SIGNS AN AGREEMENT UNDER ComMPULSION—How 
WOULD ARISTOTLE HOLD HIM OBLIGED TO KEEP IT? 


The act of signing was Biazov—hence Aristotle would pardon 
[συγγνωμη) the man for breaking the agreement, if for any 
great good, or to avoid any great evil (involuntary ). 


17 


OBJECTION RAISED TO THE STATEMENT THAT MORAL VIRTUE 
CAN ONLY BE OBTAINED BY PRACTICE. 


As the virtues all come by habituation, does it follow that we 
must be habituated “to each and every one?” 

Ans.—We may be placed in such circumstances, that we can- 
not develop all the virtues: e. g., if in moderate circumstances, 
we may be ἐλευθέριοι, but it will be impossible for us to be 
magnificent ; but suppose prosperity to come to the poor man, 
his liberality would become μεγαλοπρέπεια; so the uepake: 

πρέπη» if reduced i in circumstances, would become ἐλευθέριοσ, 
as his φρόνησιϑ would keep him right. 

A man conceals his convictions to obtain preferment. He is 
blamed, because for small good, he does what he ought not to do. 
(Mixed actions. ) 

A man is keenly disappointed in seeing a favorite dish emptied 
before it reaches him, but he suppresses his mortification, and 
does not betray it. The nameless mean of small honor—péT p10s 
and σώφρων. (Ambition.) 


ARE THE VIRTUES SEPARATE OR NOT? 
The virtues are separate inasmuch as they are on different sub- 
jects ; at the same time the σπουδαῖορ will be in possession of 
them all “potentially,” through PpPovnols. 


RELATION OF PLEASURE TO HAPPINESS. 

The Cyrenaics (Eudoxus) said that happiness was with pleasure. 
Aristotle agrees with this, because he thinks his happiness zavolves 
plecsure of a higher kind. 

(1.) It is pleasant in a higher manner—i. @., it is inherent in the 

acts themselves. Οὐ βίος. nal’ αὑτὸν 70 US. 

(2.) It is of a Aigher sort—natural (φύσει), not artificial. 

(3.) It is more comprehensive, as it includes the TO ἀγαθόν 

and the τὸ καλλόν, as well as TO ἡδύ. 

In ΒΚ. Χ. Aristotle shows that happiness is an activity according 
to the highest virtue, viz., the virtue of the intellect, which has a 
pleasure of its own, which helps to intensify the activity. 

Though such a life would be beyond man, he teaches that we 
should aspire to the satisfaction of our divine nature [abavati- 
Bet], and only cultivate earthly things in a lower way. 


ι ὃ 


SHOW THE RELATION OF HAPPINESS TO VIRTUE. 

The relation is explained 1 in Aristotle’s definition of happiness— 
ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς κατ᾽ ἀρίστην ἀρετὴν ev βίῳ τελειῷ. 
ἀρίστη ἀρετή is explained in Bk. VI. at full length, and in ΒΚ. 
X., recapitulated, it is said to be— 

κρατίστη. 

συνεχεστατή. 

ἡδίστη. 

αὐτάρκη. 

μόνῃ Ov αὑτὴν ἀγαπᾶσθαι. 
ἕν σχολῇ. 

Afterwards the life of the intellect is shown to be κρείττων 
ἢ κατ᾽ ἄνθρωπον, so that [devrép@s] moral virtue must be 
cultivated. The sum of the whole being that the good man 
[σπουδαῖοΞ] alone can be intellectually and morally happy. 


TEMPTATION. 
Ve man is blamed for being caught [O@nparos], but for being 
easily caught [€vOnparos ]. 


The Ey KPATNS is tempted, but overcomes temptation. In Bk. 
II. 8. Aristotle says that we are εὐκατάφεροι μᾶλλον 70 0S 
anolaciav  mpos κοσμιότητα (orderly conduct), and that 
we are led by our das [€xid 0071s] to that extreme, which is more 
contrary to the mean. 


Bk. 2.9. He says that in order to discover the mean, we must 
consider those things to which we are ¢«uxataqgeépoi—pleasure 
and pain are the test. 

As regards p/easures, Aristotle would follow a middle course, be- 
tween the Cyrenaics and Cynics. While Cyrenaics exalted ἡδονὴ, 
the Cynics would destroy it. The Cyrenaics would regard Helen 
as Paris did, whereas the Cynics, like Hector, would call her 
πῆμα. Aristotle, like the δημογηρόντεβ, would acknowledge 
her beauty and send her away. 

Bk. III. 1. He says that intense pleasure of actions, ἡδέα καὶ 
καλαὶ, is in no case to be considered a source of compulsion, 
which can excuse them. 

Bk. III. 5. He says that if we are responsible for our state &&15, 
we must be so in some degree, for the impression [pavtacta] 
things make upon us: i.e., if we are tempted by external cir- 


[9 


cumstances, there is something within to make those circumstan- 
ces temptation, or to make us susceptible of temptations from 
them. 


SHOW THE CONNECTION OF MORAL AND INTELLECUAL VIRTUE. 


This is indicated by Aristotle’ 5 very definition of moral virtue— 
eis προαιτρετικη) ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ p05 ἡμαϑ, 
ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ καὶ os ἂν ὁ φρόνιμο ὁρίσειεν. 

Ct. also his continual appeal to ὀρθὸς Aoyos, which is in reality 
φρόνησι5 (practical wisdom), which being practical leads to ac- 
tion, and its activity is nOinN ἀρετὴ. In all the books (except 
VI.) we have moral virtue, and in Bk. VI. we have intellectual 
alone. In Bk. X. he harmonizes the two, combining ἠθικὴ and 
mpovnois, and gives the higher place to θεώρια, which is the 
activity of speculative wisdom [copia]. 

He teaches that we are p ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίδξειν, 
but as we are mortals we need moral virtue, 7pos TO av@ poo- 
mevecOat, for in actual life, intellectual activity cannot be sepa- 
rated from moral practice. 


METHOD OF ARISTOTLE. 


Aristotle and Butler start with ὅτε, facts, and go on to princi- 
ples, ἐπὶ Tas apyas. 

Given a machine, find out tts use. 

Take human nature as it is; enquire the end of its creation ; 
start with O72, facts, and go up to principles. Thus Aristotle 
examines man's ἔργον and investigates his Gan. He supposes 
him to have an ἔργον, since all his parts have; he finds as a 
matter of fact that he has certain passions ; he assumes that they 
are part of man’s machinery; they are given him for some pur- 
pose, and their use is found by cultivation. As to the reason δι 
ott, whether man would be better without them, he does not 
enquire, but he goes on the great principle οὐδὲν φύσει ματήν. 
Thus also he treats pleasure, he finds it EY HEX PGI HEV OY ; 50 
ὀργή and ἐπιθυμία, these lower facts are γνωριμὰ ἡμῖν, and 
we proceed from effect to cause. Plato, on the other hand, starts 
with the dv’ O71, i. 6. ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν: given the use, find the 


20 


machine. He starts with principles and constructs an imaginary 


man to suit those principles; thus he proceeds from cause to 
effect—azo τῶν ἁπλῶς γνωρίμων. 


WHAT IS.THE PURPOSE OF THE Etruics? How ΡΟ THE DiIvI- 
SIONS OF THE SOUL, THE DISCUSSION OF THE VOLUNTARY, 
THE EXAMINATION OF THE VIRTUES, COME INTO‘A TREA- 
TISE, WITH SUCH A PURPOSE? 

The main purpose of the Ethics is the discovery of the chief 
good, or final end, of all man’s aspirations. 

: He identifies the chief good with Happiness, which is defined 

ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς nat ἀρίστην ἀρετὴν, ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ. 

As Happiness is thus defined, we must know what ἀρετῇ is, and 
to know this, we must ascertain what the sou/ is. 
The rational part of the soul is considered as twofold: 


(1.) λόγον ἔχον κυρίω5 (in its own right) καὶ EV αὐτῷ. 
(2.) λόγον ἔγον ὡσπὲρ τοῦ MATPOS ἀκοὐύὐστικόν τι. 


ἀρετή is likewise divided according to this difference into— 

(1.) Intellectual [Ozavonrixy]. 

(2.) Moral [ἠθικὴ]. 
And since praise and blame are the awards of virtue and vice, 
they are bestowed on voluntary actions, while involuntary actions 
meet with συγγνωμηή and éAéos. Aristotle in ΒΚ. III. discusses 
what actions are voluntary and what involuntary. 

Aristotle defines virtue as— 


eo κ , ’ - ἕω ‘ 

€5 15 προαιρετικῆ, EV MEGOTHTL OVOA TH MPOS ἡ μᾶς 
, , ι ¢ » e e ’ | ΄ Ἔ 7 

GPO MEV) Joya, HAL @S AV ὁ φρονιμοβ ορίσειεν. 


Hence he discusses the virtues at length, to show how the /aw of 
the relative mean ts applicable to every virtue in detail. 

Aristotle speaks of his treatise as a practical one—OU γνῶσι, 
ἀλλὰ mpa&is—and hence a κπονίθαβε of the virtues generally 
would seem to be necessary—iv”? ἀγαθοὶ γενώμεθα. | 


RELATION OF PLEASURE TO VIRTUE. 


: 
Bk. II. 2. Pleasure and pain are the tests of moral habits be- 


21 


ing formed. So long as pain if felt at doing any action, we may 
be sure that the habit is imperfectly formed; when the habit is 
formed, we feel pleasure. 


CONNECTION OF VIRTUE WITH PLEASURE AND PAIN. 


I. Men commit sin for the sake of pleasure, and abstain 
from what is right through dread of pain; hence. 
Plato (II. 3. 3.) says that we should be educated in 
early youth to feel pleasure and pain at proper 
objects. 

Virtue is conversant with actions and passions, and these 
are attended with pleasure and pain. 

Punishments to promote the cause of virtue prove the 
same thing, they are themselves pazns, and being 
correctives, are, like all medicinal applications, the 
opposites of what they remedy: here the disease is 
pleasure. 

Habits are formed, not as the Cynics say, by indifference 
to pleasure and pain, but by feeling pleasure and 
pain when we ought., Hence the exercise of moral 
habits (i. 6. of moral virtue) will be exhibited in 
feeling pleasure and pain when we ought. 

There are 3 objects of chotce— : 

1.) TO καλὸν. 
2.) TO σύμφερον. 
(3.) τὸ 00. 
and 3 objec ts of averston— 

(1.) το αἰσχρὸν. 

(2.) τὸ βλαβερὸν. 

(3.) τὸ λυπηρον. 

Now the good man goes right, and the bad man goes 
wrong, zm all, particularly in pleasure, which in- 
cludes the καλὸν and the σύμφερον. 

VI. The feeling of pleasure— 
ἐκ νηπίου πᾶσιν ἡμῖν συντέθραπται. 

It is engraved [ἐγκεχρῶσ μέν ΟῚ in our lives. 

VII. As motives for action, pleasure and pain are constantly 
present. 


| 
| 
; 
| 
| 


22 


. Virtue (as well as art) is shown in Struggling with diffi- 
‘ ‘ , 
culty [wept τὸ χαλεπωτερον and there is noth- 
ing so difficult to resist as pleasure. 


DEFINE ACCURATELY “MORAL NATURE.” 


Moral na rt 
Rina harry may be defined as that part of man’s compound 
ETOV] which comprises the passions, instincts, and 
appetites. | 
: —s moral nature may be seen from Aristotle’s division of 
tag is a ala ; 
τὴν . In accordance with this division, he divides the virtues 
, , , ‘ 
in ellectual ἰσοφία, OUVEOIS, φρονησι5} and moral [ἐλευθερι- 
οτης, σωφροσυνη]. 
᾿ 15 by the gradual perfection of our moral nature and the 
“" ἐ: oe 
ultivation of moral virtue, that we are brought into that state in 


which the intellectual princj : 
᾿ al principle is able to act pure] ; 
terruptedly. Ρ y and unin- 


How 2S ΤΟΊ 
FAR DOES ARISTOTLE RECOGNIZE DIFFERENT DEGREES 


ο ᾿ 
Ε CAPACITY IN MEN FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF HaAppi- 
NESS? QuorTe Passaces. 


Bk. I. 9. He speaks of happiness as πολύποινος within the 
reach of all who are not incapacitated [wexnpaopéros] for virt 
but he excludes women, slaves [εὐδαιμον έας δ᾽ οὐδεὶς ἀνὸ nt 
700 Go μεταδίδωσιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ Siov.—Bk. X. Ch δ ἶ 
and children, as incapable of ἐνέργεια κατ’ dnerdv Fact cle. 


site fee Me perfect happiness consists in intellectual] 
, - Fractically, none but the dest men can ap- 
proach, even imperfectly, to such εὐδαιμονία. Most men ne : 
rise above that which constitutes human happiness histone 
ανθρωπινὴ. The more men approach the happiness of th 
gods in the contemplative life, the more happy will ‘they I : 
indeed, there is a scale of corresponding degrees. between ha a 
ness and the capacity for intellectual activity - in the ‘iii 
animals both are totally absent; ἐμ gods both are sain 


23 


perfection; among men both exist imperfectly, but in exact 


proportion to each other. 


~ - 2 Ἢ 
To WHat ΕΧΤΕΝΤ MAy IT BE SAID THAT ARISTOTLE’S THE 


ORY 195 INTENDED TO ASSIST THE MoRAL PROGRESS OF 


SOCIETY ἢ 
Ethics, according to Aristotle, formed a sub-division of πολει- 
τικῆ), moral philosophy, the science of human life ; the other two 
parts being economics and politics (statesmanship). Z¢hics, there- 
fore, or the science of individual good, must be the groundwork 
of the rest, for unless the parts be good, the whole cannot be 
perf ect. The development of man’s moral nature is the zmtroduction 


to the principles of human society, hence he defines happiness as 


ἐνέργεια ψυχῆβ, etc. He discusses the different virtues at 
length, showing the degrees of relation they have to society. Cf. 


frequent mention of lawgivers [vouobErns| : 
(1.) They study ἀρετή). 
(2.) They reward and punish. = 
(3.) Their practice confirms his views, that vzce is voluntary. 


Aristotle insists that moral training must be enforced 


Bk. X. 


ὃν the intervention of the State. 


In Wuat Points, CHreEFLy, Dozs Morat VIRTUE DIFFER, 
AND IN WHat Dogs IT RESEMBLE THE ARTS? 

(1.) In virtues as well as in arts, the ἐνέργειαι precede the 
δύναμει. 

(2.) ‘Two opposite effects, virtue and vice, proceed from the 
same cause, so it is with the arts; there would be no 
need to teach them, if they invariably produced the 
same effects. 

(3.) It is not necessarily true that he who does good deeds is a 
good man; so neither is it necessarily true that he 
who succeeds in a work of art is a good artist, for his 
success may be owing to accident [azo TUXNS | or 
the suggestion of another [ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου ὑποθεμὲνου)]. 


24 


(4.) In arts we look merely to the excellence 6f the production, 
and only knowledge is required [yv@ozs]. But in 
the virtues, we look to the manner of doing a thing— 
it must be done— 

(2) εἰδω5. 
(ὁ) προαιρούμενος δι αὐτό. 
(c) βιβαίως καὶ ἀμεταπκινήτως ἔγων. 

(5.) Science and art seek the relative mean, and avoid the ex- 
tremes, ἃ fortiori, this will be the case with moral vir- 
tue, which is ἀκριβεστέρα πάσης τέχνη. 

(6.) Art and virtue are conversant with that which is more 
than ordinarily difficult [περὶ τὸ χαλεπώτερον]. 


How Dors ARISTOTLE DESCRIBE THE NATURE OF HIS METH- 


OD? AND HOW FAR Is HIS TREATISE CONSISTENT WITH 
THESE STATEMENTS ? 


Aristotle begins with rz προτιθέμεθα, πῶς ἀποδεκτέον 
(how he is to admit of proof) περὶ ἀπροατοῦ. We must not 
expect too much accuracy in subjects of moral investigation. He 
Says to judge aright in these matters, education is necessary ; and 
a young man is not fitted for the study of Moral Philosophy, as 
wanting experience, and because he has not the command of his 
passions—xata πάθος δῇ ; a thing which this practical treatise 
especially looks to, tél os yap (i. e. of the treatise) ov γνῶσις, 
ἀλλὰ πράξεις. 

But in point of fact, Ais treatise ἐς not a code of morals, like the 
New Testament. The only practical rules are those which refer 
to pleasure. 

He says (Bk. I. 7.) that ra πάρεργα are not to be πλείω τῶν 
ἔργων; this rule he violates by the introduction of digressions 
(cf. Bk. I. 6 and to, and account of virtues. He digresses— 

(1.) That Happiness comes from gods. 

(2.) Solon’s dictum [τυχαΐ]. 

(3.) Divisions of soul. 

(4.) The difference between praise and encomium. 


25 


? 
WHICH Is NEAREST THE MEAN, EXCESS OR DEFECT? 


If the virtue consists in encouraging a passion, naturally too 
weak, then the excess is nearer; e. g. Opacutys, ασωτία. ᾿ 

If the virtue consists in restraining a passion naturally too 
strong, then the defect is nearer; e. g. ἀναίσθησι. 


‘F EE? 
Do VIRTUES AND VICES DIFFER IN KIND OR DEGR 


In answering this question, we may enquire whether rashness 
is too much of real courage, or whether it 15 a different thing 
altogether. True courage implies— 

(1.) διὰ καλον τι. 

(2.) Due appreciation of danger. 

i tion. 

(3.) Sometimes cau , | 
But the rash man fails in the 2d pdint. Therefore, rashness differs 
From real courage in kind, but not in degree. 3 

Again, the ἐλευθέριοβ is careful to give to proper objects, in 
proper quantities, and at the proper times, etc., but the @@wrTos 
does not care how he gives. 

If the ἄσωτος had too much of the éhevGEpios, he would 
have too much of the ὅσα ἕπεται τῇ OpOn δοσεῖ. 

Hence also prodigality differs from /iberality in kind, but not in 


degree. 


ACCOUNT OF PHILOSOPHERS. 


. Aristotle, a peripatetic, B.C. 350. He belonged to no 
School. His system was to state his own opinion, 
and compare it with those of other people. 

. Plato held the doctrine of “Ideal Good” (Bk. I. 4): 
thought education very important. a 

. Anaxagoras thought “Happiness was σοφία" (specu- 
lative wisdom): thought that baser element of 
world was vows. 

. Xenocrates taught that “external good was necessary to 
happiness.” ray 

. Cyrenaics held that “ Happiness was pleasure ”"—7d0v7 

᾿ς τὸ πᾶν. Aristippus was their founder. Not men- 
tioned in Ethics, but Zudoxus is (Bk. I. 12). They 
developed into the Epicureans. 


26 


VI. Cynics (Antisthenes was their founder) said that “ Hap- 
piness was ἀρετή ἢ and that virtue was a “kind of 
apathy.” Cf. Bk. I., where Aristotle says that a 
man is φύσει πολιτικόϑ. In contradiction to this, 
the Cynics said that if a man was virtuous, he was 
single and independent [uovorns]. They devel- 
oped into the Stoics (1. το). 

VII. Heraclitus said that “‘Pleasure was more difficult to 
fight against than spirit” (θυμό5, which Heraclitus 
says is so hard to contend against). 

VIII. Socrates said that “Happiness was gporvnors ” (practi- 
cal wisdom). 

IX. Anacharsis said that “We ought to sport, in order to 
work afterwards.” 


X. Solon said, ‘We must look to the end,” and that “ The 
happy man was he who was moderately furnished 
with external goods, and practised virtue” (Bk. X. 
8). 

XI. Pythagoreans (or Italici, mathematical school founded 
by Pythagoras) held that “Numbers were the ele- 
ment,” and held the “ Doctrine of Metempsychosis.”’ 
Archytas was one of them. They are alluded to in 
Bk. I. 6-8. τριχῇ; threefold dtviston of goods. Bk. 
I. 10. They compare a good man toa perfect cube 
[τετράγωνος ἄνευ ψογου]. 

XII. Sophists, alluded to in Bk. 1., where the words are— 
“στε γόμῳ δόκει μόνον εἶναι," by convention 
only. ‘They and Paley afterwards thought that 
right and wrong existed by convention only, and not 
by nature. They are alluded to in Bk. IIL. where 
Aristotle speaks of the “good man” as being the 
μέτρον and κανών of truth to himself. 

ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μή 
(doctrine of Sophists). “Moral distinctions are 
determined by convention only, and not by nature ” 

(Bk. I. Ch, 3,8 3). 
XIII. Stmonides thought “That it, was better to be rich than 
wise.” Because philosopers were dependent on 


27 


the patronage of the rich, and not wice versa, the 
liberal man was thought to be “πὸ friend of his” 
(Bk. IV. 1): οὐκ ἀρεσπόμενοϑ. 

XIV. Theognis said that “Physicians would have received 
great rewards if they could heal the mind as well 
as the body.” 


\ 7 , 
PREFERENCE OF πολιτικῇ To ἠθική. 


Aristotle divides 20Azt17 into three parts: 
(1.) Ethics—relating to individuals. 
(2.) Economics—relating to families. 
(3.) Politics—strictly so called ; i. e. statesmanship. 
Ethics, therefore, or the science of individual good, must be the 


groundwork of the rest, families and states being composed of 


individuals. 

The branch of zoAzrz%7, which we call Ethics, bears the same 
relation to the larger sciences as the hewing and squaring of the 
stones to the building of the temple, or the drill of the recruit to 
the manceuvres in the field. 

The Greeks regarded the πόλι as the primary consideration, 
and the individual as merely secondary. We find this vein run- 
ning through the whole of the Ethics — e. g. πολιτικὴ (Moral 
Philosophy) is said to be κυριωτάτη, ἀρχιτεκτοντπή. 

Aristotle says also: εἰ yap καὶ ταὐτὸν ἐστὶν ἑνὶ καὶ πόλει, 
μεῖδον ye καὶ τελεώτερον τὸ Tis πόλεως φαίνεται, καὶ 
λαβεῖν καὶ σώδειν. ’ Ayanntov, μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἕνὶ μόνῳ, 
κάλλιον δὲ καὶ θειότερον ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν. ΟἿ too the 
continual reference to lawgivers. Again, the virtues affect the state, 
e.g. μεγαλοψυχία. Cf. also in Bk. X.: the slave cannot be happy 
because he has not the life of the noXitns. 

The Greeks, again, in the education of their children, made 
everything subordinate to their taking part in the ¢xxAnoia.— 
(Thucyd.) 


PRocESs BY WHICH ARISTOTLE ARRIVES AT HIS DEFINITION 
OF HAPPINESS. 


Aristotle, having premised that there is some one τ΄ ἀγαθόν, 
enquires into its nature, and after having stated his system (ac- 


4 29 
28 ie 


nas! Syndr is suber ἥ Diomede : ; 

2 ς at f° αν αἱ ° pe a bs , ° - , , 
curacy not ᾿ be aioe Y ’ σ΄ Extwp yap more φήσει ἐνὶ Tpweoo’ ἀγορεύων 
via, and rejects certain . . } “T Ἢ ‘9 gusto” } ἣν = 
ae th la ; down two conditions which τ ἄγαθον demands seven un’ ἐμεῖο [pofevpevos ἵκετο vias). 

ΡΩΝ fulfil : q Illustrating that spurious form of courage which arises 
. a 
and εὐδαιμονία fu from fear of public opinion. 
Vv ; 
oe τέλειο i, : 3 (3.) Hector again : 
2.) AVTAPHES. | 


“Ov δὲ κ᾽ ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μά ) ; 
, γῶν ἀπανευθὲ μαχηβ πτώσσοντα νοήσω 


He further says that the ἀγαθὰ of other things are looked for OV Ol ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυγέειν κύνα. 


in their ἔργα, in their doing well what they have to do. 

Man’s ἀγαθὸν must be looked for in his ἔργον. But has he 
one? He has, as a shoemaker, carpenter, etc. Surely, then, he as aililets ἔμβαλε θυμῷ 
has one “qua” man. The compound _. of him have one— fs i 

, ., surely, then, the whole. - “τὰ 
ey + Tepe apon rap To live? This is too general ; ! μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἔγειρε 
thing to be called his ἔργον, for brutes and plants live. But 1 | καὶ 
we set aside the life of sensation and growth, we shall have the 
life of “rational activity ” remaining in him only. So the ἔργον 
of man is ἐνέργεια puxts “κατὰ λόγον, and as the oe γον Ι Bese abate 
gst σνὸ eh ee ee cue o Peds Illustrating the spurious kind of courage which arises from 
and if there are m ; 


: ‘rit [Ovpos]. 
the ἔργον of man is then— ae spirit [Ovpos] 
ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς κατ᾽ ἀρίστην ἀρετὴν ἕν fig τελείῳ. 


Illustrating that spurious form of courage which arises from 
the fear of punishments. 


“τ κῶν “πα be ΣΝ -- οὐδ 


᾽ \ 


δριμὺ δ᾽ ava pivas μένος 
καὶ 


ΝΡ 


wee τ΄ ν» 


; EXTERNAL PROSPERITY. 
a eee Tis—a conquering of the evil passions Bk. I. 8. Aristotle says that some think that happiness in- 
ΤΠ ~ ᾿ ᾿ ‘ > ’ mR 
ὠὰ after a struggle, just as the παραλελυμένα τοῦ cludes τὴν éxtos ξευετήριαν. He agrees with 
σώματος pene are made to go the right way. this, inasmuch as he holds that it is not easy to do 
axpacia=would make the palsied hmbs go the wrong way. honorable actions without external means. 


παρὰ (against) προαέρεσιν. Bk. I. το. Human life stands in need of external goods “as ad- 
dnolacia=would lead a man to act διὰ προαίρεσιν. . ditions”’ (amulet). This forms part of his defini- 


tion of a happy man. 

Intellectual happiness wants THs ἐκτὸς εὐετηρίας, 
less than moral happiness, but as man’s nature is 
not αὐτάρκης πρὸ TO θεώρειν, he will require 
a moderate degree of external prosperity. 

Solon thought that a man, μετρίως τοῖς EnTOS κε- 

χορηγημένοσ, practising Ta κάλλιστα, and liv- 

(2.) Hector says: 


—e ing σ᾽ the h ; 
Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήησει. ing δῶφρονῶβ was the happy man 


Bk. X. 
QUOTATIONS FROM HOMER. 


᾽ ‘ » ~ 
(1.) Τούτον μὲν κάπνου καὶ κύματοϑἌ €XTOS ἔεργε νῆα. 
Circe, not Calypso, gave this advice: “Go further from 
the extreme, which is most opposed to the mean. 


30 


OBJECTIONS TO ARISTOTLE’S SYSTEM. 

He makes the “mean” το rigid and absolute, not allowing 
Jor differences of character. 

His list of virtues ts both redundant and defective. (All the 
virtues from ¢AevOepiorys down, ‘may be included 
under σοφροσύνη [owea-ppnv)). 

Many of his virtues are not moral virtues. E. g. εὐτραπε- 
λία, and the nameless mean about small honor. 

Again, ἀληθεία (truthfulness in behavior) is not a moral 
virtue®nor is φιλέα (friendliness). 

(4.) Aristotle leaves out such virtues as chastity, humility, self- 
dental, duty to God and parents. 


TRACE CAREFULLY THE DIFFERENT STAGES IN THE DEVELOP- 
MENT OF VIRTUE. IS THE ACCOUNT ‘TRUE? Is IT CoM- 
PLETE? 


Bk. Il. 1. He says that “virtues do not come by nature,” but 
7 e a ἊΝ . ᾽ ἃ a a 
πεφυπκοσι μὲν ἡμῖν δέξασθαι avtas, τελειουμένοις δὲ δια 


τοῦ ἔθου (formed by nature to receive them and being perfected 
by habit), i, 6. we have the capacity by nature, then we act, and if 
our actions are according to the requisites 

(1.) £10 GS 

(2.) προαιρούμενος δι᾽ αὐτὸ 

(3.) βεβαίω5 καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔγων 
our individual actions harden into hadits, and these @&e1s form 
character. 

Aristotle’s account is true and complete as regards heathen 
moral virtue, but Christianity does not allow that there is any 
such thing as natural piety: “For the natural man receiveth not 
the things of the spirit of God” (St. Paul); so that his being 
τελειουμένοβ δι ἔθου is out of the question. Aristotle again 
omits such virtues as chastity, humility, etc. 


ARISTOTLE 5 CONCEPTION OF THE NATURE AND ACTION OF THE 
Gops. 
(1.) Nature. 
(2.) Action. 


31 
(1.) Quite distinct from human beings, and also above commen- 
dation, because praise implies reference to a standard, 
and there is no standard to which we can refer the 
gods. | 
If the gods interfere in human affairs, and give anything to 
men, the best of all human goods would come from them ; hap- 
piness is the best, therefore, if the gods give anything, they would 
give happiness to men. 


Their existence consists in vono1s vonoews. 
(2.) Activites of 3 kinds— 
ι. ποιητική 
2. πρακτιρῇ 
3. θεωρετι»ῆ 
Productive—that of artizan—gods are above this. 

. Moral, implies desires and reason, but the gods do not have 
desires and emotions, therefore moral activity does 
not apply to them. 

Therefore we have narrowed the activity of the gods down 
to θεωρετικῇ ; therefore, the activity of the gods is 
contemplative, or intellectual. 


NATURAL ΠΙΘΡΟΒΙΤΙΟΝ, INSTRUCTION, HABITUATION. SHOow , 
THE Errect ΟΕ EACH OF THESE IN THE FORMATION OF 
A VIRTUOUS CHARACTER. 

Nature gives all men a capacity for virtue, though this needs 
to be developed by training. Some are more εὐφυεῖς than oth- 
ers. 

Starting from this, the separate virtues are developed by Aaditu- 
ation and instruction—the latter either from parents or friends, or 
from the state, or laws ; but instruction is useless unless attended 
by habituation. 

By what terms would Aristotle characterize— 

(τ.) Murder. 
(2.) Manslaughter. 
(3.) Homicide by Misadventure? 

(1.) Murder is a voluntary act, therefore there is no justifica- 

tion. A man could only justify it by believing it not 


3 


32 


wrong, but this would be ἡ καθόλον ἄγνοια, and 
does not make it involuntary, 


(2.) Manslaughter is a case of acting ἀγνοῶν. 


" 


(3.) Homicide by Misadventure comes under ἡ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα 
ἄγνοια. E. g. aman fencing for pleasure finds the 
button off his foil, and slays his friend. He did not 
intend any harm, but through accidental ignorance of 
particulars, the harm results. On this follows not 
punishment, but ἔλεος καὶ συγγνώμη; this igno- 
rance making the action ¢xvo/untary. 


ΕἾΝΕ Spurious Forms oF COURAGE. 


I. ITohitinn=Social Courage, is divided into two kinds— 


(1.) Fhat which results from pudlic opinion. 


(2.) That which results from fear of punishment, which is 
a much lower motive— 


cf. Πολυδάμας 


“Extop \. 
| Ov δὲ γχ ἐγών, &c. } 

II. Εξ gumetpias=Experience. This results from familiar- 
ity with the empty [xeva@] grounds of terror in war, 
and from familiarity with weapons. The difference 
between this and real courage is seen by a comparison 
between the conduct of regular troops, rank and file 
(στρατιῶται | who become cowardly when the danger 
Surpasses their experience, ὑπερτείνῃ]) and that of 
native militia [woAztzxa@]. Socrates thought courage 
Ξ-- πιστή μη. 

True courage implies 
(1.) διὰ καλὸν τι. 
(2.) Due appreciation of the danger. 
(3.) Sometimes caution. 


Each of the spurious kinds will be found deficient in one 
or the other, or both of the first two qualifications. 


33 
ΠῚ. ἐκ Qvsuov=Spirit— ( σθένορ, etc. | 
MEV OS, etc. 


δριμὺ, etc. | 


| ἔδεσεν αἷμα. 


Aristotle acknowledges that bravery has a large element of 
this, and illustrates his view from Homer. But it 


obeys the dictates of an irregular passion. 


IV. of evéAmides=Sanguine. ‘Their courage is based on like 
motives with that of the experienced ; when they find 
the danger greater than they expected [un συμβῇ], 
they fly. 


V. ἐξ ayvoias=Ignorant. The courage of the ignorant is 
akin to that of the sanguine, but worse, for they have 
no opinion of themselves [οὐδὲν ἀξίωμα], and when 
the danger exceeds their expectations, they fly. 


ὁ σπουδαῖος. 


Bk.1.8. Virtuous actions are pleasant, if σπουδαῖος judges 


rightly about them. | 
Bk. III. 4. The σπουδαῖοβ sees truth in everything, since he 
is, as it were, the rude and measure of it—xavoaov 


καὶ μέτρον. Cf. Sophists. 


Bk. X.6. Those things are honorable |tiuta] and pleasant 
[ἡδέα], which are so to the σπουδαῖοϑ. 


. ᾿" n~ 6 7 
Bk. II. 6. In definition of moral virtue [καὶ @3 av ὁ ppo- 
V1jA0S ὁρίσειεν]. Aristotle regards reason as 


embodied in the man of practical common sense. 


CATALOGUE OF VIRTUES. 
Excess. Mean. Defect. 
θρασύτης ave pea δειλοτῇϑ 


, > , 
᾿ἀκολασία σωφροσι,νὴ αναισθησία 


Excess. 
a6 GIT la 
Bavavoia 
yavvorns 
φιλοτιμία 
ὀργιλ ὁτῇϑ 
ἀλαξονεία 


βωμολοχία 


” , 
apéeonos + κολαξ 


καταπληξ 


34 


Mean. 
ἐλευθερίᾳ 
μεγαλοπρέπεια 
μεγαλοψυχία 
(ava@vvpos) 

1 PAOTNS 
ἀλήθεια 
εὐτραπελία 
φίλοϑ 


. / 
aid 1 Gov 


DEFINITIONS. 


‘ δ , * =e 
Chief Good=ov nav?’ ἐφίεται. 


Defect. 
ἀνελευθερία 
μικροπρέπεια 
μικροψυχία 
ἀφιλοτιμία 
ἀοργησία 
εἰρωνεία 
ἀγροικία 
δύσεριϑ -ἰ- δύσκολος 


Ξ 
ἀναίσχυντοϑ. 


. ‘ ? ~ \ ; 
Happiness=1T0 εὖ Gv καὶ τὸ εὖ πραττειν. 


τέλειον = καθ᾽ 


6 \ Ἵ Ἢ " 
αὐτο καὶ οὐδέποτε OV ἀλλο. 


2” / e \ ~ , 
aUTAPKES =O μονοὕῦμενον αἱρετὸν ποιεῖ TOV βίον καὶ 
\ κ oi sh : 
μηδενοβ ἐνδέω, 


Aristotle’s definition ) ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς κατ᾽ ἀρίστην ape- 


of happiness 


) τὴν ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ. 


- 3 


Excellence [apern| = πᾶσα ἀρετὴ, οὗ ἂν ἢ “ἀρετὴ, αὐτὸ 
τε εὖ ἀποτελεῖ, καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὑτοῦ εὖ ἀποδίδωσι. 


Moral virtue [702% ἀρετὴ] = 


THT οὐ σα, 


ἐξ 15 προαιρετική, ἐν μεσο- 


POs ἡμαβ, ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ, καὶ Gs 
ἂν ὁ φρόνιμο» ὁρίσειεν. 


β'αιον-- οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν, TOLAUTH οὖσα, εν ἢ μηδὲν 
’ ¢ , , 
συμβαλλεταᾶῖι ὁ πραττῶν ἢ 


» , = + | \ . ? ~ 
EMOUOLOV = OU ἡ ἀρχῇ EV AULT, 


᾽ Mh, ¢ ~ 
εν ois ἢ πρᾶξι:5. 


’ ‘so > 
προαίρεσι = PovAEevtinyn Opesis 


»” ~ , ; 
avd péla= MEGOTHS περὶ Pofouvs 


, 4 τῶν 
Po Phos == προσδοκία καποῦ. 


O πασχῶν. 


sa ὅ \ ° 
εἴδοτι Ta καθ᾽ ἕκαστα, 


τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν. 


καὶ θαρρή. 


” ΄ ‘ κι ~ ἢ > , 
ἀνδρειοοτε 0 περὶ τὸν καλλον θάνατον adens, καὶ ὅσα 


, ᾽ / 
Oavatov ἐπιφέρει, 


σωφροσύνη — μεσότηϑβ 


\ Ca , 
περὶ NOOVAS. 


ς ᾽ » 
υπογῦ τα ΟΥ̓Τα. 


25 


Ὃ , , , δ ’ 
ἐλευθεριότης = μεσόοτή9 περὶ δοσιν καὶ λῆψιν χρημα-- 
τῶν. 
er ? , ~ 
χρήματα-- πάντα ὅσων ἡ αξία νομίσματι μετρεῖται. 
ἀσωτίατεεἡ τῷ διδόναι καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὑπερβαλλει, 
τῷ δὲ λαμβάνει: 'λλείπει. 
? ~ , Γ᾽ - ’ 
avelkevOepiotns=7 τῷ διδοναι ἐλλείπει, τῷ λαμβα- 
. , ‘ . ~ 
verv δ᾽ ὑπερβαλλει, πλὴν ἐπὶ μικροῖς. 
᾽ ’ 
μεγαλοπρέπεια---εν μεγέθει πρέπουσα δαπανή. 
‘ , ~ κὦ Ἁ ? 
Bavavoos=0s ἐν τοῖς μικροῖς πολλὰ αναλίσπει, καὶ 
’ \ 
λαμπρύνεται παρα μέλορ. 
μικροπρέπη = ὅ5 περὶ πάντα ἐλλείπει, καὶ τὰ μέγιστα 
aval@oas, ἐν μικρῷ τὸ καλὸν ἀπολεῖ. 
" 
μεγαλόψυχος =0 μεγάλων αὑτὸν ἀξιῶν, ἀξιος ὧν. 
, ξ “ω * , ? τ- / 
σωφρωντεὸ μικρῶν a&i0s καὶ τοιτῶν aSiwv εαυτον. 
- ς ; e ‘ 7 ~ ᾽ ’ » 
yaovos=0 μεγαλὼν ἕαυτον a&i@v, αναξιο5 ὧν. 
’ ς ὃ ἋἋ » on 3 ~ δ \ 
pinpowpvyos—==o ἐλαττονῶν 1) ἄξιος, ἀξιῶν EAUTOY. 
/ , ? , 
πρφότην me μεσότηβ περὶ opy as. 
πρᾷοϑ = ὁ ἐφ᾽ οἷς Get, καὶ ots δεῖ, ὀργιξόμενοσ, καὶ os 
δεῖ, καὶ ὁτὲ, καὶ ὅσον χρόνον. 
’ 
φιλία (Courtesy) = φιλέα ἄνεν τοῦ στέργειν. 
» e ~ ς \ > , \ ; » 
ApPETKOS == 0 τοῦ ἡδυ9 εἶναι στοχαξομενοβ, μὴ δι ἀλλο 
Ti. 
’ »» ¢ ~ 6 \ = ’ tad 3 , , 
κολαξτεὸ τοῦ ἡδυ9 εἶναι OTOYACOMEVOS, ONGS ὠφέλεια 
ε - ’ ᾽ ΄ ‘a \ , 
Tis αὑτῷ γίγνηται eis χρήματα καὶ ὁσα δια χρημα- 
τῶν. 
’ ΄ \ ’ ΄ ~ 
δύσπολοι-ε: οὗ πρὸς πάντα ἀντιτείνοντες, καὶ τοῦ λυπεὶν 
οὐδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν φροντίξοντεϑ. 
> , ¢ \ ~ ᾿ ’ ‘ Se : : 
ἀλαδων --εὸ προσποιητικοβ τῶν ἐνδοξῶων, Mi μη ὑπαρ- 
’ , ‘ ᾿ , 
χόντων, καὶ μειδόνων ἢ ὑπαρχει. 
Ν +) ~ ? ~ \ δ , » , , 
εἴρων τε: ὃ5 δοκεῖ ἀρνεῖσθαι ta ὑπάρχοντα, ἢ ἑλαττῶ 
ποιεῖν. 
4 ‘ ς \ ς , ¢ ~s > 4 
ἀλευθητικοοσπεὸὺ Ta vaapyovta Cphohoy@yv εἴναι περῖ 
ς ‘ " , » . ’ 
QUTOV, καὶ οὔτε μείξω, οὔτε ἐλαττῶ. 
? λ , ἘΘΩ͂Ν . , Ἢ ‘ “ὃ ‘ . i of 
evtpamtAia = μεσοτῆβ περὶ TO HOV EV παιοίᾳ. 


τ ’ Φ.ὃ ~ , 
εὐτραπελοιῖτε οἱ ἐμμελῶς παίξοντξϑ. 


4 6 


βωμολοχοιτεε οἱ γλιχόμενοι παντῶβ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ 
μᾶλλον oroyagopuevot τοῦ γέλωτα ποιῆσαι, 1) τοῦ 
; . , \ 
λέγειν εὐσχήμονα, nat μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν σκωπτόμενον. 
ἄγριοι-ε: οἵ > αὐτοὶ ἃ πὸ : 7 I 
yptot==or μητ' αὐτοὶ ἂν είποντεβ μηθὲν γελοῖον, Tos 
τὲ λέγουσι δυσχεραίνοντεϑ. 


᾿ as 0 ~ ; . = 
ἑπιδεξιοτηβ τετοιαῦτα λέγειν καὶ ἀκούειν, οἷα τῷ ἐπιει- 
/ 


MET i ἐλευ ῳ a ) 

κεῖ καὶ ἐλευθερίῳ ἀρμοττει. 

aides = pofos τὴς ἀδοξία. 
And Bk. II.: 


μεσοτὴβ καταπληξ τῶϑ καὶ ἀναισχυντία. 


THREE KINDS OF IGNORANCE. 
(Under general head of Involuntary Actions.) 
* / ” 
‘4 ΄ --ττ- “J re : 
(1.) 7 καθολου ἀγνοια περ. g. man says drunkenness is not 
wrong.— Denial of great principles of morality. 
6 . ~ , ” . . 
7 ὲν τῇ προαίρεσει AyYVOLA = denial of a particular case, 
falling under some admitted general principles: e. g., a 
man says drunkenness is wrong, but says to drink this will 
not make me drunk. 
6 9 ἐν ᾽; m . 
(3.) 7 καθ᾽ ἕκαστα [ayvota]=ignorance of details: 6. g., a 
man says drunkenness is wrong, but this liquid is water, 
but he finds he has drunk gin by mistake. 


Ihe only kind of ignorance which makes an act involuntary is 
this last, 1. e., accidental ignorance of circumstances attending 
the action. It is followed by é€leos and συγγνωμη. 


Physical Matters. Moral Matters. 
Nature gives us a δύνα- Nature gives a δύναμι, 
is, which results unavoid- this produces πάθη, but 
ably in certain actions, 6. g. these may be good or bad, 
seeing, in sight, only one i eit isa “dvvapis τῶν 
issue. ἐναντίων," and therefore 
not parallel to physical δύ- 
vayis. But these πάθη 
may be so guided that a 
é&1s is reached, and then 
only good or only’ bad (as 
the case may be) can be 
done: i.e. this é§zs really 
equals a δύναμι; with only 
one result—either virtue or 
vice. This acquired δύνα- 
μῖ5 is parallel to the natural 
physical δυναμῖ3. 
Therefore Aristotle usually has δύναμι in morals in the last 
sense, as almost equal to é7s, but still sometimes uses the term 
in the first sense (cf. Bk. II. 5. 1.). 


Proper Oxjects or Bovdnors. 

I° “That objects of desire are really good things, and so ulti- 
mately the ‘chief good.’”—Plato. This contradicts 
facts, as men desire bad things. 

Il. “That they are whatever may appear to each individual to be 
good” [ἑκάστῳ τὸ doxovv|.—Sophists. This seems 
to deny that there are objects fer se desirable, and 
vice versa. 

The truth seems to be, that as when we speak of things being 
wholesome and so on, we mean wholesome to those whose bodies 


38 


are in a healthy state [τοῖς μὲν ev διαπκειμέν οἱ5] ; so, also, 
when we speak of things being desirable, we mean such things as 
are objects of desire to those whose minds are well regulated. 
Thus we escape both the above objections: we maintain that 
there are things na/urally and per se desirable, and that in the 
midst of the aberrations and perversions of individual men, who 
simply follow pleasure and ayoid pain, the destres of the σποῦ- 
Saios are an index to us of what is thus naturally and per se dest- 
rable. 


Ψυχή. 
I. 7. 14. ἐνέργεια ψυχῆϑ =in arriving at man’s function. 
I. 13. 9. φυχῆς δύο wépn=rational and irrational. 
I. 13. 7. δεῖ τὸν πολιτικὸν εἰδέναι Ta περὶ ψυχῆ =the 
definition of happiness implies a knowledge of 


the nature of virtue, and consequently of the 


nature of the soul. 


Pvois. 
Ill. 3. 7. φύσιϑ αἴτιον tt==under proper objects of deliber- 
ation. 
Il. 1. 2. οὐδὲν τῶν φύσει ὄντων aliws ἐθίξεται Ξε: moral 
virtue differs from intellectual excellence in that 
it is not innate—i. e., moral virtue does not come 


by nature. 
/ ? ᾿᾽ ; κα ον ς , " 
X. 9. 6. φύσι5 οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ὑπαρχειπεεὶῃ three ways of ac- 
quisition of virtue— 
(x.) φύσει. 
(2.) ἔθει. 
(3.) διδαχῇ. 
Il. 1.3. ovTe φύσει ovTe mapa φύσιν αἱ dpetai= in 


proof that moral virtue does not.come by nature. 


39 


’ 
DESCRIBE THE VIRTUE OF μεγαλοπρέπεια. 
, cm chile : 
ἐν μεγέθει πρέπουσα danavy.—Fitting expenditure on a 
large scale. Its general characteristic is magnitude, but this 


must be in relation to three things— 

(1.) The person who gives. 

(2.) Circumstances of gift. 

(3.) The object of gift. 

Hence every munificent man is liberal, but not vice versa. 

Defect = μικροπρὲπεια = meanness. 

Excess == Bavavoia and aneypoxakia—bad taste and vul- 

garity. 

There is a sort of sctentific skill implied in μεγαλοπρέπεια 5 

cf. ὁ peyar ompenns ἐπιστήμονι ἔοικεν; to decide under what 
circumstances great expenditure is befitting. There must be the 
desire of what is noble—rov καλοῦ ἕνεκα. 

Munificent acts must be done cheerfully and ungrudgingly— 

ἡ δέω καὶ MPOETLUGIS 5 there must be no close calculations of 
how much? or how little? will it cost. 

Fitting occasions for the display of munificence, 6. g.: 

(1.) Service of religion—Aezroupy iat. 

(2.) Great public or patriotic services (equipping a trireme) 
[τριηράρχῳ], or defraying the expenses of a state 
embassy [ἀρχιθεωρῷ!. 

(3.) Wedding [ὅσα εἰσάπαξ γίνεται], entertaining strangers 
[ὑποδοχὰς ξένων], making [δωρεαϑ] and returning 
presents [ἀντιδωρεαϑ1. 

(4.) Toy-presents to children, 6. g. σφαῖρα and AnnvOos— 
but this is not such greatness as to constitute μέγας 
λοπρέπεια in its proper sense. 


41 


. 4 
views as to the nature of é«vdatpovia: e. g. 


(x.) Uneducated, think it is something relative ; e. g. 


pleasure, wealth. 
ETHICS.—BOOK I. (2.) Philosophers, something absolute. 


The Method of Ethics (a digression). 

Ethics must start with moral facts, as known to us, 
for its apyai, and these facts must be supplied by 
proper education, by a process of €016 10S. 


SHAAN ARTA ITO Te RP Ne ele TS Ὁ ana 


Ch. 1. téAn=“ends or objects of action.” All human ac- 
tion aims at some good as its téAos. Such τέλη 
are either 


he ogi | Ay ἀκ OE IND το - 


Ch. 5. What is Happiness? 

(1.) Aios anohkavotinos=end ἡδονή. This is 
, a low view (cf. Sardanapalus). 
Thus téAy are manifold, and they may be arranged (2.) βίος πολιτιπὸ =end τιμή; but this is (a) 


in an ascending scale, according to the importance 3 precarious ; (2) sought as a proof of ἀρετή. 
of the actions to which they are relative. (3.) Bios θεωρητικοϑ =end σοφία ; this is κρε- 
itt@v ἢ κατ᾽ ἀνθρῶπον, so that δευτέ.- 
pws, we must ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθα- 


vaticéetv. Cf. ΒΚ. X. 


(1.) Acts—évépyezaz, or 
(2.) Certain results—épya. 


to télos=the “chief good.” The supreme end of 
all action will be the “chief good,” to know which 
is important as a guide to right conduct. Naturally, 


it will be the τέλος of the highest and most com- (4.) βίος yenuatiorns =end πλοῦτος, but this 


prehensive of the sciences, i. e. of πολιτικη (the is only a means to a higher end, and does vio- 
téAos of the state having fair claims to be ranked lence to our natural inclinations [βίαιος 
higher than that of each individual). Tis |. 


The “study of Ethics” (a digression). anpifeta is -Ch. 6. Criticism of Platonic Doctrine. 
not to be expected in a science dealing with subject- ax 
matter so vague, as justice, virtue, &c. Hence its Ch. 7. General Characteristics of Happiness. 


conclusions will be general. (1.) It is the end and object of all moral action. 
The proper judge on points of Ethics will be the ze- , (2.) ἁπλῶ, τέλειον, absolute and final end, al- 

παιδευμένο5, and not young people, because ways to be sought for its own sake, and never 

(1.) Inexperienced [ἀπειροο1. for the sake of something else, as pleasure 


(2.) Impulsive [κατὰ πάθος δῇ]. and honor are sought. 


(3.) Unable to profit by the steady. (3.) avtapxes, and so above, and not to be classed 


N. B. People may be young in character, as well as with other ἀγαθα. 


in years [véos τὴν ἡλικίαν ἢ τὸ ἦθος veapos]. (4.) The épyov of man being, not in the life of 
nourishment and growth [θρεπτικὴ and 


εὐδαιμονία is on all sides allowed to be “the end,” αὐξητικὴ), or of sensation [aioOnrixm], 
r “chief good,” of man, but people have different but in the moral life of a rational being— 


. 
en EEE MUN GSS PER OIE) RTE RRA NE eNO, ARE SREB RRRR I rs ment SHANE Φανμασα 


42 


πρακτικῇ Tis τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντοβ; and 
the exerc tse of this life inits highest form, 1. e. 
κατ᾽ ἀρετήν, constitutes happiness; but 
this requires time, so ἕν βίῳ τελείῳ. 
“ Ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ἐν βίῳ 
τελείῳ." (Digression.) 
Given an outline of Happiness, time will fill in the 
details, only let it be remembered— 
(1.) ἀπριβεία must not be expected. 
(2.) That certain facts [τὸ ὅτι] must be accepted 
as axioms or principles [apyat'] to start 
: with. : 
These apyat must be properly obtained and rightly 
defined— 
(1.) ἐπαγωγῇ. 
(2.) αἰσθήσει. 
(3.) ἐθισμῷ. 


Ch. 8. Current theories about Happiness shown to harmon- 
ize with the definition now advanced— 
1. Popular [τὰ λεγόμενα]. 
(2.) That the soul’s good is the highest. 
(4.) That the highest good is an activity of 
some kind. 
(c.) That Happiness consists in “living and 
doing well.” 
2. Philosophical theories—[Ta ἐπι δητούμενα) that 
Happiness consists in 


(a.) Virtue. 

(4.) Prudence. 

(c.) Wisdom. 

(4.) One of these, with pleasure added. 
(c.) This, with external prosperity added. 


As to ὦ the definition agrees with it, and improves 
upon it ; ¢, the definition necessarily implies 
pleasure, and that of the highest kind ; ¢, the 
need of external prosperity is acknowledged 
in a moderate degree. 


43 


Ch. 9. How is Happiness attained ? 


(1.) If anything, it would naturally be Θεόσδοτο, 
but this belongs to ἄλλη σκέψι5. 

(2.) Though certainly ‘* θειότατον," it is also πο- 
λύκοινον, and attainable by a course of 
study and training to all who are not ‘‘ πὲπη- 
ρωμένοι πρὸς ἀρετὴν.» 

(3.) Not due to τύχη; for this would be παρὰ 
φύσιν. 

(4.) As the end of πολιτικὴ, it seems attainable 
by State instruction. 

(s.) Not being attributed to children or the lower 
animals, it seems to imply a perfect ἀρετὴ 
and fios. 


How far does Happiness really depend on external 
circumstances? Is it true, as Solon said, that “a 
man cannot be called happy as long as he lives”? 


[χρεῶν τέλος ὁρᾶν]. 

(1.) Even after death, a man can be affected by 
the fortunes of those living. 

(2.) If rightly called happy after death, why should 
he not be called so, while actually happy in 
lifetime ? 

The fact is that Happiness is dependent on ‘‘ αἵ κατ᾽ 
ἀρετὴν évépyétat,” which are pre-eminently /ast- 
ing and stable, and not on τυχαΐέ, the effect of which 
is comparatively slight. 

Thus the “εὐδαίμων "" is never ἄθλιος or εὐμετά- 
Boos. On the whole, Solon's dictum is not right. 
A man may rightly be called happy in his lifetime, 
if he satisfies our definition, but only happy gua 
man. 


Are the dead wholly independent of the fortunes of 


the living? Not wholly, but yet so far that their 


happiness ts substantially secure. 


παν NO AE ct GEISER Pe ee a NMEA NA OR AR SN - 


44 


oe ? , ν 
Ch. 12. Does εὐδαιμονέα belong to ἐπαινετὰ or τίμια 
, Ἁ 
1. Not to ἑπαινετα, for 


(α.) ἔπαιν ο5 implies reference to a standard, 


whereas evdazpovia is itself the highest 


good, and so beyond all standards. 


(2.) em atv os is specially directed to ἀρετὴ 


(not εὐδαιμονία), 
2. but to τέμεα, for it is ἐς ἀρχὴ καὶ ἀΐτιον τῶν 
ἀγαθῶν." 


Ch. 13. Since ἀρετὴ (1 ) enters into the definition of εὐδα:- 
μονία (2), and is the special concern of the 7 OA1- 
TLS, it is necessary to ask, What is ἀρετὴ ? and 
since the ἀρετὴ now in question is puy7s ἀρετὴ), 
we must further ask, What is meant by ψυχῇ} 
adopting the popular account. 

1. TO ἄλογον, which itself includes 

(a.) Θρεπτικὸν (not distinctively human, and 
specially active in sleep, which is ἀργία 
φυχῆθ, 9 λέγεται σπουδαία καὶ 
φαύλη). 

(ὁ.) λόγου μέτεχον, which in ἐγκρατεία and 
ἀκρασία, is found in conflict with, 
though capable of being submissive to, 

2. TO λόγον ἔχον, which thus includes 

(a.) λόγον κυρίως ἔχον. 

(2.) ἀκουστικον λόγου. 

Hence — may be divided into— 

(1.) Stavonrixn,. 
αἱ ἠΘι»κὴ. 


‘ 


DESIRES ARE OF Two KINDs: 


(1.) Those which are common [xotvai]. 

(2.) Those which are acguired [ἐπίθετοι and ἴδιοι]. 

The former every one feels, but in the latter tastes vary. 

Few err in the first, and only in the direction of quantity. 
persons are called yaorpipapyot. 


45 


But concerning peculiar desires, many err and in many ways. 
It is clear that in this ill-regulated pursuit of pleasure consists 
the excess,in reference to the virtue of temperance, i. e., intem- 
perance. 

In relation to pain, however, it does not consist like cowardice, 


‘in shrinking from it, so much as in feeling at the absence of 


pleasure. In Ch. X. 1. temperance is said to be a mean state, 
on the subject of pleasures and pains, but to be less concerned 
with pains. That is to say, the temperate man does not get his 
character (like the courageous man) from enduring pain, but 
from not feeling pain at the loss of pleasure; so that practically 
the operation of temperance is confined to pleasures. Those 
who are in the defect with regard to pleasures do not exist. Such 
a person, therefore, is nameless. The temperate man holds a 
mean position between excessive devotion and utter insensibiiity 
to pleasure. 


INTEMPERANCE IS MORE VOLUNTARY THAN COWARDICE, IF WE 
CONSIDER THE SINGLE ACTs. 


(1.) Because in intemperance the pressure arises from pleasure, 
whereas in cowardice it arises from pain. 

(2.) Because it is safe and easy to resist temptations to intem- 
perahce, but the reverse is the case with temptations to 
cowardice. 

But if we consider these vices as hadits, cowardice is more vol- 

untary than intemperance, for no one deliberately resolves to be 


intemperate, as he sometimes does to be a coward. 


THINGS TERRIBLE [ro φοβερὸν] ARE OF TWO KINDs. 

(1.) ὑπὲρ ἀνθρωπον. 

(2.) κατ᾽ ἀνθρωπον. 

Every man of sense will fear the former. The latter differs in 
magnitude, and may be feared too much or too little. The brave 
man fears, or feels confidence, at what he ought, when he ought, 
and from the right motive. [ὁρέξεται yap ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει] ; 
that which characterizes anything is its end; τὸ καλόν charac- 
terizes courage, and therefore it is its end, or motive. He who 
is in the extreme of fearlessness is nameless, but may be called 


Re ee ee a 


46 


μαινόμενος ἢ ἀναλγητός =if he feared neither σεισμόν nor 
κύματα, as they 5αγ---καθάπερ φασὶ του Κελτούθ. He who 
is in the extreme of confidence is rash [Opacus]. He is also a 
boastful man. Such persons are impudent cowards. He who is 
in the extreme of fear is OezAos. The rash are eager before 
dangers [zpozereis], but when those dangers come they stand 
aloof [ἀφίστανται]: whereas the brave are quiet beforehand 
[πρότερον δ᾽ Gv x201], but when the crisis comes, active [o& eis]. 

Suicide is no proof. of courage, because a man merely dies to 
avoid greater evils. 


SOCIAL VIRTUES. 


There is a nameless mean state between over-complaisance 
[ apeonos | and surliness [Ovoxodos]. It most resembles 
friendship, except that it does not necessarily argue any af- 
fection to the person to whom we show it [φιλία avev τοῦ 
στέργειν]. Sucha person is agreeable to all, whether acquaint- 
ed [γνωρίμου] or unacquainted [ἀγνῶτα] with him, but he 


acts on every occasion as is fitting [ἐν ἑκάστοις ws ἁρμόδει], 
all this having reference to τὸ καλόν. He will always prefer to 
give pleasure, where it is honorable to do so. If the action would 
bring disgrace to the person who does it [κἀν τῷ ποιοῦντι δ᾽ 
ἀσχημοσύνην φέρῃ), he will show disgust [Ovoyeparive? |, 
But he who aims too much at giving pleasure, if he does it for no 
motive, is over-complaisant [a@peoxos]; but if he does it fora 
motive, he is a flatterer [κόλαξ]. The man who is in the defect, 
who feels disgust at all things [πᾶσι δυσχεραίνων], is a quar- 
relsome and ill-tempered man [δύσκολος and dvoEpis]. 

The mean state connected with boastfulness is nameless, Now 
the boastful man is one who pretends to honorable things, which 
do not belong to him. The man in the defect is called the false- 
ly-modest man [εὔρων]. The man in the mean is a straightfor- 
ward kind of person [αὐθέκαστοο], who always speaks and acts 
truthfully. He rather inclines to defect, because it appears to be 
in better taste. He who pretends to greater things than he really 
has, if it is for no motive, appears to be rather a foolish, than a 
bad man ; but if he does it for the sake of money, he is more dis- 
graceful. 


47 


The falsely-modest man, inclining to the side of defect, appears 
to be in better taste.. Of this character was Socrates. Under 
this head come the “affected knaves” [βαυκοπανοῦργοι: 
sometimes this exceedingly false modesty appears to be boastful- 
ness, as in the case of the Lacedzemonians. 

Since there is recreation in life and pastime with sport, there 
is a mean state connected with this. Those who exceed in the 
ridiculous are called buffoons. Those who do not say anything 
laughable, and are displeased with those who do, are clownish 
[ἀγριοι] and surly [oxAnpoi]. The man who is in the mean 
state is called the man of graceful wit, as being εὔτροποϑ, or 
versatile, 

Buffoons [βωμολόχοι] are sometimes so called. But they 
differ much. The difference between that which is becoming in 
jesting and what is unbecoming, may be seen in the old and new 
comedy. Tact [é2zde&10rns] is particularly connected with 
well-bred wit. 


BOOK X. 


The final explanation of the true nature of Happiness is now 
given. The coflusions of the First Book being recapitulated, i 
is clear that Happiness must be something chosen for its own 
sake. This might be thought to be amusement, but few would 
allow this to be the final aim of life, since the very notion of 
amusement is the occupation of the intervals of work. The self- 
chosen end, then, must be virtuous action. Happiness being the 
energy of the highest virtue, we must ascertain what is the high- 
est virtue. This will be the exercise of the highest faculty, intel- 
lect, on the highest subject-matter, in the highest method, which, 
as before proved, is contemplative speculation, or wisdom [θεω- 
pia]. Wisdom is most continuous, most pleasant, most self-suffi- 
cient, self-eligible, and most consistent with leisure. This life of 
wisdom is the life of man, so far as he has an element of the divine 
nature in him—not of man, as man—a being compounded of intel- 
lect and affections. The secondary form of happiness belonging 
to man, “qua” man, is to be found in moral virtue, the central 
virtue of which is Prudence. 

Whilst moral virtue needs many external advantages, wisdom 
requires few if any. The wise man lives the life most akin to the 
divine, and therefore, if the gods at all regard men, he will be 
the man most beloved by the gods. The end of the whole trea- 
tise being practical, it remains to ask, How are men to become 
good? Natural goodness is the gift of heaven to few, Instruc- 
tion avails little for the undisciplined. Moral training or educa- 
tion is the most important agency in the formation of goodness. 
This education would be best conducted by the State, but when 
this is impossible, domestic education must be conducted by the 
head of each household. But whence must the head of each 
family learn the true principles of education? Politicians cannot 
teach him, for they are mere empirics; Sophists cannot teach 
him, for they are mere theorists. Aristotle therefore proposes 
himself to write a treatise on the true principles of education, 


49 


especially as they should be exhibited in a State. This he has 
done in the “ Politics.” 


To τέλοο. 


An end or final cause implies intelligence—implies a mind to 
see and desire it... The appearance of ends and means in Nature 
(and this Aristotle distinctly reeognizes) is a proof of design in 
the operations of Nature. When we come to Ethics, what is 
meant by “an end of human actions”? For whom is this end? 
Is it an end fixed by a higher intelligence? In short, is the 
principle of ;Aristotle the same as the religious principle that a 
man is born to work out the religious purposes of his Maker? 
To this it must be answered that Aristotle is indefinite in his 
physical theory as to the relation of God to the design exhibited 
in Creation. And so too he is not explicit, in the “ Ethics,” as 
to God’s moral government of the world. On the whole, we may 
say at present that “moral government,” in our sense of the 
words, does not at all form a part of Aristotle’s system. His 
point of view rather is, that as physical things strive all, though 
unconsciously, after the good attainable by them under their 
several limitations, so man may consciously strive after the good 
attainable in life. 

We do not find in the “Ethics” the expression τέλος τοῦ 
ἀνθρώπου, but τῶν πρακτῶν τέλος (I. 7.8.). It is best, 
therefore, to exclude religious associations (as being un-Aristote- 
lian) from our conception of tle ethical τέλος, and then we may 
be free to acknowledge that it is evidently meant to have a defi- 
nite relation to the nature and constitution of man. Thus Aris- 
totle assumes that the desires of man are so framed as to imply 
the existence of this τέλος (I. 2. 1.). He asserts that man can 
only realize it in the sphere of his own proper functions [ἔν τῷ 
ἔργῳ τοῦ av@pa@nov—I, 7. 10.], and in accordance with the 
law of his proper nature, and its harmonious development [κατὰ 
τὴν οἱκεὶαν apetnv—I. 7. 15.]. Is man then, according to 
this system, to be regarded similarly to one of the flowers of the 
field, which, obeying the law of its organization, springs and 
blooms and attains its own peculiar perfection? This is no 
doubt, one side, so to speak, of Aristotle’s view. But there is 


5° 


also another side, for while each part of the creation realizes its 
proper end, and in the language of the Bible “is very good,” 
this end exists not for the inanimate or unconscious creatures 
themselves, it only exists zz them. But the ethical τέλος not 
only exists 7z man, but for inan; not only is the good realized 
in him, but it is recognized by him as such; it is the end not 
only of his nature, but of his desires; it stands before his thoughts 
and wishes and highest consciousness as the absolutely sufficient, 
that in which he can rest, that which is zz and for itself desirable. 
[ἁπλῶς δὴ τέλειον τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν asi—I. 7. 4.]. The 
ends of physical things are for other minds to contemplate, they 
are ends objectively. But ends of mural beings are ends subject- 
ively, realized by and contemplated by those'moral beings them- 
selves. 

The final cause, then, in Ethics, is viewed as it were from the 
inside ; or rather, the peculiarity is that the objective and sub- 
jective sides of the conception both have their weight in Aris- 
totle’s system, and are run into one another. The τέλοβ τῶν 
πραπτῶν, or absolute end of action, has two forms, which are 
not clearly separated. In the first place it is represented subject- 
ively, as happiness, and in the second place, objectively, as the 
“morally beautiful.” 


FREEWILL. 


Some place the ground of action in enlightened selfishness, or 
utility, with or without religious ‘sanctions added, and others in 
an authoritative internal principle, the dictates of conscience, or 
an intuitive moral sense; while Kant rejects as unworthy all 
external motives and inducements to right action, and endeavors 
to reduce all to the idea of duty, as an ἃ priori law of the will. 
On this point the utterances of Aristotle are simpler than those 
of modern moralists. He takes a broad view of man, as a crea- 
ture in the universe, and asks what is the chief good of man, and 
how is it attainable? He answers that the “summum bonum”’ 
consists in the sense of vital action in accordance with the law 
of man’s being [ἐνέργεια ψυχῆϑ κατὰ τὴν oinelav ἀρετήν]; 
that this is only permanently attainable by the formation of habits ; 
and that €&e7s arises out of acts. On the inducements to partic- 


SI 


ular acts, he speaks only incidentally. He says (III. 1. 11.) that 
the beauty of an act may put us under a sort of compulsion to 
do it; that we have an intuitive sense of moral beauty [aio@n- 
τικὴ μεσότη5]}7; that we have a general wish for the good (III. 
4. 4.) which furnishes the idea of the end to be aimed at in ac- 
tion, and that it is only a very foolish person [κομιδῇ ἀναισθή- 
tou—III. 5. 12.] who does not take the right means to this, or 
who forgets that a single bad act tends to the formation of a bad 
habit. All this absorbs the right in “the beautiful” and “the 
good,” and refers everything in life to the law of man’s being; 
it is a great and simple theory. Yet still the conception of “the 
right” is deeper than that of “the beautiful” and “the good.” 
It springs perhaps from a Semitic source, and with its cognate 
conceptions of duty and obligation, it predominates over the 
ethical systems of modern times, which are thus strongly dis- 


tinguished in character from a Greek system of the fourth cen- 
tury B. Ὁ. 


THe “Irony” or SOCRATES. 


Aristotle says: “Irony often consists in disclaiming qualities’ 
that are held in esteem,” and this sort of thing Socrates used to 
do (IV. 7. 14.). 

The irony of Socrates, like any other living characteristic of a 
man, presents many aspects from which it may be viewed : 

(1.) It has a relative significance, being used to encounter, 
and tacitly to rebuke, rash speaking, and every kind of 
presumption, It was thus relative to a sophistical and 
rhetorical period, but has also a universal adaptability 
under similar circumstances. 

(2.) It indicates a certain moral attitude as being suitable to 
philosophy, showing that in weakness there is strength. 

(3.) It is a part of good breeding, which by deference holds its 
own. 

(4.) It is a point of style, a means of avoiding dogmatism. 

(5.) It is an artifice of controversy, inducing an adversary to 
expose his weakness, maintaining a negative and critical 
position. 

(6.) It is full of humor, and this humor consists in an intellect- 


52 


ual way of dealing with things, in a contrast between 
the conscious strength of the wise man and the humility 
of his pretensions, in a teacher coming to be taught, and 
the learner zaive/y undertaking to teach. 

Such are some of the most striking features in the mien and 


bearing of Socrates. 


STATE THE PROCESSES BY WHICH ARISTOTLE ARRIVES AT THE 
Supyects or “THE JupGmMent” [βουλευσι5) 


He does this by a series of exclusions, as it were. 


(1.) αἴδια. ==sets this aside. 
(2.) κίνητα. 


| 
(a.) According (ὁ.) Not ac- 
to fixed law. cording to 
cf. solstices. — law. 
Bit ae | ee 
Entirely vari- By chance: e. ta ἀνθρωπ:ι- 
able: ¢.g. g. finding of va, 
drought. “treasure. 


Ἁ ? , 
ta avOponiva 


Things not in Things in our 
our power. power. 


4 , \ ? , . . 
So the object of BovAevots = ta avOpm@iva of things in our 
. ‘ ” 
power. Exact science excluded, and τὰ aioOnra; then left, 
. . ri ‘ ¢ > \ , 
“the sphere of things contingent "—‘‘ Ta ws éxi τὸ πολυ." 


Happiness Dors Not CONSIST IN AMUSEMENT. 


(1.) Those who say it does consist in amusement are incompe- 
tent judges, knowing no higher pleasure than amusement. 
Children and tyrants seek it, who have not had a taste of 
purer happiness [eiAzxprvovs — etA@=to roll, sepa- 
rate the fine from the impure]. 


- 


53 


(2.) Amusement is with a view to work, not work with a view 


to amusement, i. e., it is a “means to work and not an 
end.”’ 


(3.) Amusement has no necessary connection with what is most 
noble in man (e. g. the element of σπουδή). 


Happiness is dependent on virtue, which has to do with earn- 
estness, and not amusement [ zazdza'. 


” , ? aid 4 ? ΄ 
éoiné δὲ καὶ "Ava&ayopas οὐ πλούσιον ουδὲ δυναστὴην 


° on \ ᾽ , Ν ‘ “ 9 nN , 
ὑπολαβεῖν tov evdaipova, εἰπῶν οτι οὐκ av θαυμασεῖεν; 


él Tis aTOMOS φανείη τοῖς πολλοῖο. 


(Χ. 8. 11.).. Anaxagoras thought that the happy man was 
neither rich nor possessed of political power, and that by holding 
this view, he might appear absurd to the majority of people. 
This comes under the chapter of Secondary Position of Moral 
Excellence, under the heading of A Moderate Degree of External 
Goods being Necessary for Human Happiness. 


ἕν σχολῇ. 
This does not imply leisure ig the sense of inactivity, but it 
means simply that the évépyéta@ is uninterrupted, and goes on 
perfectly harmoniously, without fatigue or effort. 


“An opinion which is universally received, must have some 
element of truth in it”; it is in accordance with this principle 
that Aristotle compares his definition of happiness with other 
popular and philosophical ones in the First Book of the Ethics. 


ase Ἢ ‘ tn ’ ‘ 9 ν *% = s 
ΓΟ yap xanov τοῦ ἀπείρου, TO δ᾽ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασ- 
μένου. 


[ὡς οἱ Πυθάγορειοι εἴκαξον. 7--- Ἐν} οἵ infinite, but good is 
of the finite. This was the view of the Pythagoreans. 

“Good implies a limit, evil does ποῖ. (This comes in discus- 
sion of mean, just before great definition of Moral Virtue.— 
II. 6. 14.) 


54 


WHEREIN DOES THE EXTREME IMPORTANCE OF THE MORAL 
FREEDOM OF MAN CownsISsT? 


If a man were devoid of 2poaipeois, he would be no more 
than a beast, or mere machine ; he would have no hopes or aspira- 
tions, no motive for efforts. THis actions would all be determined 
by causes independent of himself, and he would have no hopes 
for the future. 


Tue Four GREAT aitia. 
(1.) φύσις. 
(2.) avayun=e. g. larger stones underneath in the building 


of a wall. 


(3.) τύχη. 
(4.) vous. 


RELATION OF φρόνησιϑ TO MORAL VIRTUE. 
Moral Virtue gives certain general principles, ppovnots teach- 
es one how to apply them. 


Bx. X. Cu. 8. § 3. 
N. B. ppovnors is the guiding principle of all the moral vir- 
tues [‘‘ συνεξεύκται δὲ καὶ ἡ φρόνησιο τῇ τοῦ ἤθους ἄρε- 


τῇ agi 


ἐλευθερία. 

<< μεσότηξβ περὶ δόσιν καὶ λῆψιν χρημάτων." Tt ἐς more 
connected with giving than receiving. = Τ7)5 yap ἀρετῆς τὸ εὖ 
ποιεῖν ἢ τὸ εὐ πάσχειν, καὶ τὰ καλὰ πραττέιν, μᾶλλον ἢ 
τὰ aigypa μὴ πράττειν. --- Αεἰΐοε and positive, rather than fass- 
ive and negative. The extremes—aowria and ἀνελευθερία--- 
but “prodigal” is used in wider sense [oupmAénxorres] applied 
to the intemperate generally. Liberality is that “quality or vir- 
tue which enables us to make the best possible use of money.” 

Liberality is one of the most popular of virtues [pzAodraz 
σχεδὸν μαλιστα]. 


55 


Three conditions— 


(1.) A noble motive [τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα]. 

(2.) Due consideration of the recipients, the amount, and oc- 
casion [τἄλλα ὅσα ἕπεται τῇ ὀρθῇ δόσε! 

(3. ) With cheerfulness [ἡδέως ἢ ahvnes). 


ὁ élevGépios must not be indifferent to the source from which 
money comes. He will want it, as a means of giving, and not to 
secure it for himself. Liberality is to be measured, not by the 
absolute, but by the redative amount given. Liberality is more 
often found in those who have izferited, rather than in those who 
have made their money. Princes cannot be called prodigal, for 
their wealth is all but boundless. ὁ ἐλευθέριοϑ is an easy man 
to have dealings with [evxorv@vyros]. He will regret more 
keenly having speet too little, than having spent too much, and 
he is no friend to ‘Simonides’ [οὐκ ἀρεσκόμεν ο5]. ὁ ἄσωτος 
is easily cured by age and want [eviatos τὲ yap ἔστι καὶ ὑπὸ 
τῇς ἡλικίας καὶ ὑπὸ THS azoptas] ; the prodigal rather weak 
than vicious, for the benefit of others; but the avehevdépros 
benefits no one, not even himself. liberality’ is incurable [avia- 
ros]. It isa more natural vice than ἀσωτέα ἰσυμφυοξστερον]:; 
it has many forms [πολευειδέ5]. It does not come in “com- 
pleteness ” [0AOxAnpos—Ch. iv. 5. 7.] to everybody. “‘ avedev- 
Gepia” is more opposed to ““ ἐλευθερία" than ““ aowria.” 


INSTANCES OF EXTREMES BEING SUBDIVIDED. 
Excess. Mean. Excess. 


AVOPELOS ... ..O€1A0s. 


a PET HOS SVGEPIS 
κόλαξ δύσκολο. 
pOovos =is the feeling of pain at other people’s prosperity. 


γέμεσι5 =righteous indignation at the undeserved success of 
our neighbors [7éAas]. 


Perse MANE τος EEA NN αν NOTE er SET 
" 


56 


ἐπιχαιρεκαπία =is the feeling pleasure at the wrong persons 
prospering. 


δικαιοσύνη = 
(1.) Covers the whole πε] of virtues. 
(2.) Fair dealing in matters of money or busi- 
ness, 


THE IDEA OF SELF-SACRIFICE IN ARISTOTLE. 


The surrender of one’s life to the State, in the exercise of the 
best form of courage. 


Humility= The avoidance of any exaggerated claim to knowl- 
edge or power ; underrating oneself not humility. 

Aristotle’s peyadorvyos seems to be satisfied with himself, 
wherea§ the Christian must feel that he comes very far short of 
his ideal. 


μεγαλοπρέπεια τεεῖϊβ more a Greek notion than one which 
would be consistent with our modern ideas. 
. . . , ? , ? , 
Aristotle’s social virtues, e. g. piAia, ἀλήθεια, εὐτραπελία, 
a modern moralist would not elevate to such a high position, 


Vengeance= 
III. 5. 7. tTtu4@pia—vengeance, not with a view to 
ϑ 


reforming a character. Legislators τι-᾿ 


μωροῦντατε evil-doers. 

III. 8. 12. When taking vengeance—70 ovraz, when 
angry, pained. 

IV. 5. 12. ἀνθρωπικώτερον yap τὸ τιμωρεῖσ-- 
Gat. In describing the bad-tempered 
—yaderoi. 


ORDER OF ARRANGEMENT IN TABLE OF VIRTUES. 


(1.) From elementary to complex. 
(2.) In order of time. From those which are developed early in 
life to those which come /ater in life. 


57 


(3.) From Jower to higher, that is, with regard to the rational 
part of our nature. 

(4.) From the more purely self-regarding to those which have 
reference to others. 


Four cardinal virtues of Plato: 
1. Courage. 

2. Temperance. 

3. Wisdom. 

4. Justice, 


~ Ἁ ‘ i ὦ \ 
σκοπεῖν On TA προειρημένα YN ENL Ta ἔργα καὶ TOV βίον 
, , a @ ἐξ . 9 
ἐπιφέροντας, καὶ συνῳδοντῶν μὲν τοῖς EPpy ols ἀποδεκτέον, 
΄ς , . ¢ 
διαφωνουντῶν δὲ Aoyous ὑποληπτέον. (ΒΚ. Χ. Ch. 8.§ 22.) 


Secondary position of moral excellence. Practical experience 
is the highest tribunal ; the authority of wise men is subordinate 
to it. For man, continuous activity of the intellect is a practical 
impossibility. One must have a moderate amount of external 
goods. The /ast appeal must be to facts, and to the practical ex- 


perience of life [in describing the intellectual and contemplative 
life]. 


“IDEA OF ‘INVOLVEDNEsS.’”’ 
οὐ yap οἷόν τε ἢ οὐ ῥᾳδιον τὰ ἐκ παλαιοῦ τοῖς ἤθεσι 
κατειλημμένα λόγῳ μεταστῆσαι. (Bk. X. 9. 5.) 
Cannot change, by reasoning, those who newer have experi- 
enced true pleasures [ἄγευστοι Ovres]. Moral theories have 


no influence except on those already fitted tu receive them. (Bk. 
X., importance of education.) 


Χαλεπὸν ἀποτρίψασθαι πάθος ἐγ κεχρωσμένον τῷ βίῳ. 
(Bk. II. 3.8.) Referring here to pleasure, when Aristotle speaks 
of “virtue as being connected with pleasure and pain.” 


"Evia yap εὐθὺς ὠνόμασται συνειλημμένα μετὰ τῆς 
paviornros. (ΒΚ. 11. 6. 18.) (e.g. ἐπιχαιρεκακέα, κλοπή.) 


“For some things involve the notion of badness directly they are 
mentioned.” 


os 


ὑπ pang rg mt tee ae ste ete, Pee ee 


hae 


: 
| 


58 


When Aristotle is talking of “virtue being a mean state,” one 
must not suppose that, because virtue consists in moderation, a 
moderate amount of all things under the sun is good. Because 
it is moderate in things bad in themselves, the right amount is 
not a moderate amount, but no amount at all. 


Why IS IT THAT A CHANGE FOR THE WORSE IN THE MoRAL 
CHARACTER OF AN INDIVIDUAL Dogs Not LESSEN HIS RE- 
SPONSIBILITY? (Bk. III. Ch. 5. § το.) 


Character is the result of single acts, for which he is responsible. 
A change for the worse is the result of single acts, and for each 
of these single acts he is responsible, therefore he is responsible for 


the vesudt as well. A man is bound to know that a change would 
follow from the acts. 


ARGUMENTS WHICH TURN Upon THE MEANING OF WorDs, 
1. E. ETYMOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS. 


(1.) ἀκόλαστοσ =unchastised. 

(2.) aow@ros =in light of suicide—wastes his ovoza (sub- 
stance). Cf. also essence—ti ἦν εἶναι. 

(3.) προαέρεσι5 ---πρὸ ἑτέρων αἱρετόν. 

(4.) ἔθος and 700s =bundle of ἔθη makes an 700s—cf. mos, 
mores, 


πάθη and πράξεις are the raw matertals, which are to virtues 
as food to bodily strength. 


aid as. 

Sense of shame, or fear of disgrace. It resembles the fear of 
danger ; but in the former men grow red [ἐρυθραίνονται], and 
in the latter pale [ὠχριῶσιν]Ἴ. 

We praise modest youths, but no one will praise δὴ o/d man 
for being shamefaced [αἰσχυντηλό5], because he ought not to 
do anything of which he will feel ashamed. It is absurd to say 
that a man is good because he would feel shame if he were to do 
an unworthy action. [“΄ εἰ yap πράξαι, αἰσχύνοιτ᾽ ἄν." 


59 


Shame is only hypothetically [ἐξ ὑποθέσεω] a virtue. 


porn. 


, ” 
ἄλογον λόγον ἔχον 


’ 
OpenTtinov | | 
, ’ : 
αἰσθητικὸν | | 
, , , 
OPEKTLHOV = πειθαρχικὸν Aoy@ κυρίως. 


, . 
Openxtinov =animal nature. 
κυρέω» = divine nature. 
Opentinov +. κυρίω» = moral nature. 


AMBITION, OR HONOR ON A SMALL SCALE. 
The mean connected with this is nameless, for sometimes we 
praise the love of honor as being manly, and sometimes the man 
who does not love honor [a@gzAorzpos| as being a man of mod- 


eration [μέτριο5] and of self-control [σωφρων]. 
Since, then, the middle place is vacant, the extremes contend 


for it. 
, ” ~ , 5 , Ψ 
ἐγΑνωνύμου δ᾽ οὔσης τῆς MEOOTHTOS ws ἐρήμης EOLKEV 
ἀμφισβητεῖν τὰ ἄκρα." (Cf. too, simile of favorite dish.) 


THE VARIETIES OF ὀργιλότηϑ ΑΒΕ: 

(1.) opyiAot=passionate [παύονται δὲ ταχέω5]. ὝΠΕΥ re- 
taliate openly [ἀνταποδιδόασιν, ἡ φανεροί εἰσι], 
which is the best point they have [ὃ καὶ βέλτιστον 
ἔχουσιν]. 

(:.) ἀπκρόχολοιτε: quick - tempered [ὀργέλοι πρὸς πᾶν καὶ 
ἐπὶ παντί!. 

(3.) mumpoi=sulky. Keep anger for a long time, and are only 
content when they have obtained revenge. δυσδια- 
Avrot=hard to reconcile. ἕν αὑτῷ δὲ πέψαι τὴν 
ὀργὴν χρόνου δεῖ. : 

(4.) yalexo1=ill-tempered—disagreeable to live with [zpos 
τὸ συμβιοῦν]. 


60 


It is not easy to decide about our anger in all cases, as the de- 


cision in particular instances must depend upon our moral sense 
γχ'- ν , ¢ / 9 ” 
[Τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ xpiors]. CE. St. Paul, “ Be angry, and sin not. 


, . . - 
I. 6@ppwv =the man in whom virtue has become a habit— 
bad desires are conquered—no struggle. 


II. éyxpatns = one who has a struggle between good and bad 
desires, and acts rightly. 


? , 
ΠῚ. axpatns—=one who has a struggle between good and bad 
desires, but acts wrongly. 


3 4 Ψ . . ry. 
IV. axoA\aoros one in whom zice has become a habit. The 


desire of good is eradicated. He does wrong without a 
struggle. 


ὁ μεγαλόφυχος. 
(1.) Must be a good man. 


(2.) Generally supercilious—vzeponrns—[thought to be] 


(3.) Open in his friendships and hatreds [pavepopuioos καὶ 
PavEepogiros]. 

(4.) His aim is honor on a great scale. 

(5.) Discriminating in honor paid him; will receive it, be- 
cause nothing better to give. 


(6.) Neither shuns nor courts danger [μικροκίνδυνος οὐδὲ 
φιλοπκίνδυν ο5]. 


(7.) Loves to confer, is ashamed to receive benefits. 
(8.) Asks no favors—does not go in search of honor. 


(9.) Cares more for truth than opinion—no gossip [avOpw- 
mohoyos]. 
(10.) Not apt to admire, for nothing is great to him, 
(11.) Does not recollect injuries. 


(12.) Not anxious about trifles, 


(13.) Possesses what is grand and unproductive, rather than 
what is useful. ~ 


61 


‘Two KINpDs ΟΕ ILLIBERALITY. 


(1.) Those who do not give where they ought— 
6. g. φειδωλοί (sparing). 
γλίσχροι (stingy). 
niu fines (niggardly). 
xupivonrptotys (skinflint). 
(2.) Those who gain whence they ought not— 
6. g. τοκισταῖύῖ (usurers). 
nxufevtns (gamester). 
Awmodurns (clothes-stealer). 


ὁ μεγαλοπρέπης. 

The magnificent (or munificent) man, in cases of private ex- 
penses, spends money on such occasions as occur only once 
[εἰσάπαξ]; e. g.a marriage (ya pos). His home is furnished 
suitably to his wealth — ‘“‘ οἶκον κατασπκπευασασθαι πρε- 
ποόντωϑβ τῷ πλούτῳ." He differs from the liberal man in 
largeness of sums which he deals with—‘‘ woAAaxut δοσπκον 
ay ᾽ 
αλητῃ. A 

σωφροσύνη. 

Temperance [σωφροσύνη] is concerned with pleasures and 
pains, but more especially with the pleasures. These are of two 
kinds : (1.) Those of the dody [oapartos]; (2.) Those of the soul 
[ψυχῆ3]. . With pleasures of the soul, temperance has notlfing to 
do, nor is it connected with all the bodily ones, only indirectly 
connected with smed/, hearing, and sight. Temperance, therefore, 
has especially to do with fowch and faste, and most of all with 
touch. (Cf.) This proceeds from a false physical theory of 
Aristotle’s, that the pleasure of eating lay in the contact of food 
with the esophagus— 


διὸ καὶ nv&ato τι5, opopayos (Philoxenus) ὡν τὸν pa- 
bd 4 , ς Cal 
pvyya αὑτῷ μακρότερον γεράνου γενέσθαι, ws ἡδόμεν ο5 
τῇ ἀφῇ. 


But the nobler pleasures of the touch, 6. g. rubbing in the gym- 


nasium, are distinct from this. 


62 


> ’ 
απολωστος. 


This is a metaphor derived from a child who has not been 
properly chastised. The desire of what is pleasant develops 
itself greatly, unless it is (chastised) curbed. ‘The appetitive part 
must be under the sway of reason, as a child is under the author- 
ity of a teacher. 

This is the man in whom vice has become a habit, and the 
desire of good is eradicated; he does wrong without a struggle. 


IN ANY DELIBERATE ACTION THE FOLLOWING STEPS MAY BE 
TAKEN. 


(1.) AovAnots = desire, or wish, for some end to be obtained. 


(2.) BovAevozs = deliberation on the several means by which 
this end may be obtained. 


(3.) mpoaipeots =deliberate choice of some one means, or 
series of means, as the most eligible. 


After this 7p@&1s follows. 


ἱκανῶς yap καὶ ἐν ἐγκυκλίοις εἴρηται περὶ αὐτῶν. 
(ΒΚ. I. 5. 6.). In considering some of the theories as to the 
nature of happiness. Js if virtue ? 


, ᾿ \ \ a : ~ , oo , 
Aeyetar δὲ περὶ avtis καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξ ὡτεριπκοῖς λογ οἵϑδ 


? , » ? ~ 
, αἀρκουντῶ» ἔνια, καὶ χρηστέον αὐτοῖς. 


(Bk. I. 13. 9.). In speaking of the swofold division of the soul 
into the rational and irrational, “popular treatises will suffice.” 


ARISTOTLE DIVIDES THE PROCESSES OF THE SOUL INTO THESE 
THREE: 


(1.) πάθος = process on which follows pleasure or pain: 6. g. 
rear. 


(2.) δύναμι =is the faculty of having these feelings. 


ed . . . . 
(3.) €&ts =is the permanent relation in which we stand towards 
the παθη. 


63 


ἔργ ov. 
(1.) The proper function of anything, or the using of the high- 


est part of it: e.g. the ἔργον of the soul is the using 
of vous. 


(2.) Result produced. 
(3.) Something difficult. 


‘Iv’ ἀγαθοὶ γενώμεθα. Are THERE ANY PracTicaL RULES 
GIVEN FOR THIS PuRPOSE? 

Aristotle enlarges on the indefiniteness of the general principles 
of morals and application in particular cases ; they fall under no 
TEYVN or mapayyéhia, i. e. no practical set of rules. 

(1.) To become good, do good actions [habituation]. 

(2.) Good education from youth [this to make others good }. 

(2.) Avoid worse extreme. 
(4.) Avoid extreme to which you are most liable. 
(c.) Be on your guard against pleasure. 

But the question of practical rules is really the question of 

politics and not of Ethics. 


Unpver Heap or Προαίρεσι5. 


We are responsible for all voluntary actions, which we do with- 
out προαίρεστϑ ; i. 6. without going through a process of Uelib- 
eration and choice: e. g. actions done on the “spur of the mo- 
ment” [τὰ éSaipryns]; whether from anger, desire, or any other 


motive. 


“VIRTUE IS ONLY VICE A LITTLE EXAGGERATED OR A LITTLE 
CONTROLLED.” PROVE FROM ARISTOTLE THAT THIS IS 
A MISREPRESENTATION OF HIS THEORY OF THE MEAN. 


This misrepresents Aristotle’s theory, because virtue is the right 
regulation, not of a vice, but of some feeling (or action) which in 
itself is neither good nor bad. It is good when you have the 
feeling in right amount, on right occasions, etc., bad when you 


64 


have it in excess or defect. But no diminution or exaggeration 
of a vice will make it a virtue; you diminish or exaggerate the 
feeling (e. g., confidence or fear, to make courage). 


Four Kinps or apyai. 
5 6. g. statue. 
The material marble 
The efficient 
The formal design in artist’s mind 
The final purpose or end for 
which he intended it. 


Comprises (of man)— 
(1.) The principle of life. 
(2.) The emotional nature. 
(3). The rational nature. 


‘Turee Ways or ArRIvING aT Apyai. 
(1.) éraywy? = induction—e. g. chemistry. 
(2.) αἰσθήσει-ε: perception—e. g. AXIOMS. 
(3.) ἐθισμῷ =habituation—e. g. moral principles. 


OnE Doers Not FEEL PLEASURE ΙΝ EVERY VIRTUE. 


6. g. One does not feel pleasure in courage, except so far as 
the attainment of the end and ideal of his being is felt and real- 
ized [πλὴν ἐφ᾽ ὅσον τοῦ τέλους ἐφάπτεται), because there is 
an element of pain in it; so that we do not energize pleasantly 
[τὸ ἡδέως ἐνεργεῖν]. Nor need we deny that a more reckless, 
though less brave man, might perhaps make a better rank-and-file 


soldier. 
Φ ’ ‘ ‘ , 
ΣτρατιώταΞς δ᾽ οὐδὲν ἴσως κωλύει μὴ τοῦς τοιούτους 
> ? \ \ = ‘ ᾽ , ” 
npatiorous εἶναι, ἀλλα tous ἧττον μὲν avdpetous. ἀλλο 


δ᾽ ἀγαθὸν μηδὲν ἔχοντα. 


65 


Under discussion of “How can courage, which involves pain 
and loss, have a pleasure in itself ? 


THERE IS SoME GREAT END. 


For if there were no great final end, then we should have cer- 
tain desires, with no object to fulfil them. This cannot be, be- 
7 at , , 
Cause οὐδὲν MUGEL ματῆν. 


EXAMPLES OF παρέργα. 
(1.) That happiness comes from gods [ἄλλῃ σπκέψι51. 
(2.) Solon’s dictum (part of it)—rvyai, 
(3.) Division of soul. 
(4.) The difference between praise and encomium. 


ἕν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρέσι5. 
Decision in moral questions rests with moral sense, Or percep- 
tion. This oecurs when Aristotle is saying that it is hard to say 
. . . 3 , 
at what point an action begins to be wrong (Bk. IV. 5.—opytdorns) ; 


how far a man may go without being #éxr0s. Cannot lay down 
a rule. 


αἰσθησιβ will guide him: ὃρθὸς Aoyos gives general rules: 
aioOnots applies them to particular cases. 


Cf. also in connection with rules for attaining the mean, Bk. II. 
9. (Rules for Mean). 


Man's ἔργον. 
( Vide process by which Aristotle arrives at his Definition of Happiness. ) 


Every part of us has got something to do: e. g. eye =seeing. 

The parts of a man have an ἔργον. So he, gua man, must 
have one. 

Not mere living, not a life of sensation or growth, but ἐνέργεια 
ψυχῆς κατὰ λόγον. If this is his ἔργον, his happiness will be 
to have it in the best manner [ἀρίστην] : but that will require 


time. So εν βίῳ τελείῳ is added, which covers the idea of 
external goods as well. 


